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Abstract 
Science controversies and how they play out in the media can affect national policy. 
Examining how these debates are communicated sheds light on the underlying 
motivations of certain players that have a stake in the outcome. Looking at the 
communication of science policy controversies gives us a glimpse into the alliances or 
oppositions between these players. This thesis examined how three key fields – politics, 
science and science journalism – interacted to shape how selected science policy 
controversies are communicated. This examination allows us to situate the stance of 
science journalists relative to the fields of science and politics, and gain better insight 
into their motivations when participating in the debate on science policy controversies. 
Three examples of science policy controversies are investigated. The first two examples 
(the implementation of a national science policy and the application of an environmental 
policy) are culled from the Science Forum, which is a journal published in the 1970s. 
This historical example of Canadian national science policy debates is employed to 
situate the third more contemporary example of science policy controversy – the 
‘muzzling’ of government scientists. Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptual triad of practice, 
habitus and social fields is used as a historicized methodological tool to map the social 
interactions found in the science policy controversies examined. This theoretical 
approach also provides a deeper analysis of the patterns of interaction that emerged.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Science controversies and how they play out in the media can affect national policy and 
can impact how we live our lives in surprisingly direct ways. For example, the outcome of 
a science controversy could mean a policy that makes crucial childhood vaccinations 
mandatory (Boyce, 2006; Mikulak, 2011) or result in a policy that restricts the use of 
stem cells to investigate cures for debilitating diseases (Levine, 2006).  
When science controversies are debated in the media, opinions from scientists and 
politicians often take centre stage (Nisbet et al., 2003; Nelkin, 1995; Nisbet and 
Lewenstein, 2002) while journalists have traditionally reported on these issues without 
actively voicing their opinions, basing this practice on notions of independence and 
objectivity – even as these notions are heavily debated in the field. However, journalists 
are key players who often decide who gets a voice in the media (Rothman, 1990) and 
what information is disseminated to the public, so it is equally important to understand 
their role in how scientific controversies play out. My research goal was to illuminate the 
relationships between science journalists, scientists and policymakers and thereby 
explore any underlying power struggles between these key players in the face of science 
policy controversies.  
To this end, this thesis examined how three key fields – politics, science and science 
journalism – interacted to shape how selected science policy controversies are 
communicated. Examining the communication of scientific controversy sheds light on the 
underlying motivations of certain key players that have a stake in the outcome of said 
conflict (Nelkin, 1992; Mukerji, 2007; Endres, 2010). Thus, looking at the communication 
of controversies gives us a glimpse into the power struggle that can ensue and the 
alliances or conflicts between key players.  
 
Existing research on communicating scientific controversy that have taken a sociological 
view tends to focus on how agents from two of the fields in question interact – for 
example, scientists and journalists or scientists and policymakers or policymakers and 
journalists (e.g. Anderson, 2012; Jensen, 2010). However, research on how agents from 
all three fields (journalists, scientists and policymakers) interact during a scientific 
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controversy is limited.1 As such, research is limited on how journalists are connected in a 
broader sociological context to other key players (i.e. scientists and policymakers in this 
case) in the face of scientific controversy. An examination of the interaction between 
agents from these three fields may help reveal previously hidden patterns and deepen 
our understanding of what factors impact media discussions on a given scientific 
controversy. In a broader sense, this line of study is significant because scientific 
controversies and how they are communicated to the public tend to impact national 
science policy (Endres, 2010). 
The limited attention paid to the interactions of multiple fields may be due to the lack of 
bounded, researchable examples and/or the lack of methods able to give insight into 
these complex interactions. One way to explore how journalists interact with politicians 
and scientists during scientific controversies is by using Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptual 
triad of practice, habitus and social fields (Rawolle and Lingard, 2008), which represents 
the main “thinking tools” in Bourdieu’s body of work (Bourdieu, 1989). This conceptual 
triad – social fields in particular – enables us to view key players as agents of their field 
and view their interactions with each other in terms of class and power relations 
(Bourdieu, 2005). The question of bounded examples where science journalists, 
scientists and politicians interact and are researchable is addressed through the 
historical artifact of the Science Forum (1968-1977). The Science Forum is a journal that 
features contributions from science journalists, scientists and policymakers. While not a 
typical mass media form, many prominent players in the science journalism field who did 
contribute prolifically and regularly to scientific news and debate in several mass media 
outlets at the time were regular contributors. Taking into consideration that the Forum 
was spearheaded by a prominent science journalist and that the topics and 
controversies covered mirrored those that were discussed in the mass media at the time, 
a close examination of this artifact is indeed warranted as it provides a larger and clearer 
window into the views and opinions of many key players that shaped the outcome of 
those controversies. 
Pierre Bourdieu’s key concepts constitute a “theory of practice” or more precisely a 
“theory of research practice” and thus only take shape when used in the practice of 																																																								
1 For example, an Ebsco database search on August 29, 2016 of the databases Academic Search 
Complete, Communication & Mass Media Complete, Communication Abstracts, Political Science Complete, 
International Political Scince Abstracts and SocINDEX using “controversy”, “scien*”, “politic*” and “journalis*” 
produced 213 hits – none of which examine all three fields in a single investigation. 
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research (Grenfell, 2012). Bourdieu proposes that there be an ongoing reflexive interplay 
between theoretical explanation and empirical research investigation when constructing 
a social object of study (Grenfell, 2012). In a Bourdieuian analysis, data are first 
collected and analyzed before a theory can be constructed (Grenfell, 2012). This also 
holds true in the formation of my premise in the case of my analysis of the Science 
Forum. The journal was published mainly throughout the ‘70s and is heavily populated 
with opinion pieces. It is a forum that was used by prominent science journalists at the 
time (e.g. Peter Calamai, David Spurgeon) to editorialize their views on science and its 
impact on society. It represents a researchable historical example of how science 
journalists, scientists and politicians interact. The main goal of the journal was to discuss 
controversies that impact national policy and to provide a platform for all sides of the 
debate in the op-ed and letters sections, which were quite robust. After a preliminary 
review of much of the correspondence in the Science Forum between the key players 
representing different fields, a premise took shape that when faced with scientific 
controversy that impacts national policy, the science and science journalism field tend to 
collaborate to oppose the political field. This thesis was designed to explore this premise 
more deeply within the correspondence found in the Science Forum, as well as explore 
whether this premise repeats itself in a contemporary example of science policy 
controversy. The following research question guided this thesis: how do the fields of 
science journalism, science and politics interact in discussions on science policy 
controversies in the media?  
 
Why study scientific controversies? 
The examination of scientific controversies can provide a window to the interactions and 
agendas of certain key players and reveal previously hidden social aspects of scientific, 
journalistic and political practice (Collins, 1985; Martin and Richards, 1995; Endres, 
2010; Mukerji, 2007). When studied empirically, controversies or contests of knowledge 
have been found to be deeply rooted social processes (Mukerji, 2007).  
 
In general, the voices of government, industry and societal elites (i.e. scientists, doctors, 
lawyers and celebrities) tend to take centre stage in the media. Historically, their 
influence on agenda setting and framing cannot be understated (Sigal, 1973; Tuchman, 
1978; Berkowitz, 1992; Cobb and Elder, 1971). In media coverage of scientific 
controversies, government sources, industry members and scientists are more likely to 
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be the dominant voices in the media (Nisbet et al., 2003; Nelkin, 1995; Nisbet and 
Lewenstein, 2002). As such, Nelkin (1992) argues that scientific controversies tend to 
“revolve around the question of political control.” Often, as the conflict unfolds, “the 
special interests, vital concerns, and hidden assumptions of various actors” will be 
clearly revealed (Nelkin, 1992). Public science controversies not only involve debates 
between scientists but “contestation over the role of science in decision making” 
(Endres, 2010) or how much science and research should influence subsequent 
policymaking decisions. The study of scientific controversy represents a very important 
area of study because “when science enters the realm of public deliberation, it is no 
longer insulated from interaction with policy concerns” (Endres, 2010). This can be seen 
in the examples of science policy controversies in this thesis as science is used to justify 
or contest specific policy concerns by the key players examined here.   
 
Media coverage of controversies certainly can have an impact on policy outcomes and 
key political players will try to lobby the media to gain public support for their position 
(Nisbet, 2003). In fact, using the theories of agenda building, Nisbet (2003) has found 
that in the face of controversy, competing interests function as news sources, feeding 
the media packaged news items that serve their purpose.    
 
Past research points to a correlation between the media coverage of a scientific issue 
and societal debates on the topic in question – with coverage increasing drastically when 
the topic enters the realm of political controversy (Nisbet, Brossard and Kroepsch, 2003; 
Nisbet and Huge, 2006). Given the apparent link between science controversies covered 
in the media and the impact of debates on science policy (e.g., Boyce, 2006; Mikulak, 
2011), it seems warranted to examine the key players involved in these overlapping 
spheres (i.e. science controversies and science policy).  
Scientists have a long tradition of playing an advisory role to policymakers in most 
democratic societies. They have served on advisory panels and through expert 
testimony have shaped policy in numerous instances (Jasanoff, 1990). These close 
couplings are centuries old and have served to blur the boundaries between science and 
politics (Scheufele, 2013; Westfall, 1985; Scheufele, 2014).  
Likewise, there is a blurring of lines between the media and science. The media plays a 
role in shaping public opinion and perception while at the same time there is a growing 
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expectation that scientists advocate for the public understanding of science, the funding 
of science, and other goals (Scheufele, 2014; Weingart, 1998; for a good historical 
discussion, see Logan, 2001). The result is a growing interconnection between science 
and the media, which Weingart (1998) has termed “medialization” (Weingart 1998). As 
such, a closer examination of the interactions of key players in debates on science policy 
controversies – science journalists and scientists in particular – as is done in this thesis 
analysis helps further clarify the nature of these interconnections. 
Research design and specific aims 
The overall objective of this thesis was to use Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptual triad of 
practice, habitus and social fields (Rawolle and Lingard, 2008) as a lens to examine the 
interactions between the fields of science journalism, science and politics. The 
presented work charts new territory by identifying and examining alliances and 
oppositions between the fields of science, science journalism and politics. The research 
sheds light on the interactions of scientists, science journalists and policymakers when 
debating science controversies that affect policy. Its results help improve our 
understanding of the actions of science journalists who cover science policy 
controversies. 
The thesis was undertaken in four phases, which are detailed in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
Qualitative analysis was used throughout the thesis due to its strengths in identifying 
patterns and themes that can emerge from an observable frequency of occurrence 
(Sandelowski and Barroso, 2003a; 2003b). This design was seen as appropriate due to 
its strengths in providing a deeper analysis of the opinions and comments of agents in 
the fields examined here. In addition, a historical construction was done for each of the 
controversies explored in this thesis to help situate the analysis into the broader 
historical genesis of the controversies under examination. This was an essential step of 
using Bourdieu’s conceptual triad as a lens of analysis. Given that the analysis of 
interactions between fields is a historicized methodological tool, the historical 
construction of these controversies is essential in providing a basis to better understand 
what motivations may be driving different players in their actions. The specific aims of 
this thesis and the chapters in which they are discussed include:  
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1. To test the premise that in the face of controversy that impacts science policy, 
the science journalism and scientific fields collaborate to oppose the political field 
(i.e. the field of power) (Chapter 4). 
2. To examine if this premise can be found in an historical example and if it is 
replicated in a contemporary example of science policy controversy (Chapter 4 
and 5).  
3. To explore the relevance of the Science Forum as a historical artifact of debates 
in the media on science policy controversy and the shaping of science policy 
(Chapter 5 and 6). 	 	
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
Lewenstein argues that past research on controversies reported in the media has tended 
to rely on a simple diffusion model of science communication (where information is 
filtered through the media to the public in a linear fashion), thus failing to provide a 
complete view of the media’s role in scientific controversies (Lewenstein, 1995). In her 
examination of the roles mass media and scientific journals play in the construction of 
controversies, Brossard states that "science communication is a complex phenomenon, 
for which boundaries between scientific journals and mass media can be permeable, 
rather than rigid as traditionally assumed” (Brossard, 2009). This further justifies looking 
at the Science Forum (a journal that is part science news outlet and part discussion 
forum) and the Canadian Science Writers Association (CSWA) website as sources that 
are not typical mass media outlets to examine science policy controversies. As opposed 
to the simple diffusion model, some argue that science communication should be viewed 
as a “continuum” that allows for the back and forth flow of information between different 
forms of scientific communication (Hilgartner, 1995). A circular or web communications 
model has also been proposed where all forms of communications are linked and lead 
back to each other (Lewenstein in Jassanoff, 1995). Regardless of the model, mass 
media occupies a central place and is a common node in the network (Brossard, 2009). 
In her analysis, Brossard found that mass media and scientific journals can interchange 
their traditional roles in science communication in the face of controversy and conflict. 
She concludes that “proper analysis of mass media’s role (or any other communication 
media) within this process cannot accurately be achieved without taking simultaneously 
into consideration other players” (Brossard, 2009).  
 
The following sections will present existing literature that looks specifically at the 
interactions between (a) science journalism and science, (b) science and policymaking, 
and (c) science journalism, science and policymaking – all within the context of science 
policy controversies covered in the media.2 																																																								
2 Papers included in this section were culled from a search performed on March 17, 2016. The Ebsco 
database was used including the following databases: “Academic Search Complete”,  “SocINDEX”, 
“MEDLINE”, Communication & Mass Media Complete,” Communications Abstracts” and “Political Science 
Complete” from 2010-2016. There were 144 hits. The search words used were “scientist” and “journalist” 
and “media controversy” in all text. Studies that kept a North American focus were included, with a few 




Journalism and science interface 
The literature presented in this section detail studies that examined the interaction 
between journalists and scientists in the context of scientific communication and 
controversies that played out in the media. 
 
In terms of the interactions between journalists and scientists, a five-country survey 
found that “interactions between scientists and journalists are more frequent and smooth 
than previously thought” (Peters et al., 2008). A study by Eyck and Williment (2004) 
investigated the journalistic practices used in the New York Times in three separate food 
technology controversies (milk pasteurization, food irradiation and biotechnology). They 
found that across the span of over a century reporters have consistently relied on larger 
social values to shape their role as “interpretive communities” (Eyck and Williment, 
2004). The idea that journalists act as interpretive communities supposes that they draw 
on larger social values of their time when reporting and that this tendency then colours 
how the news is framed and disseminated to the public. This suggests scientific topics 
that generate controversy and are discussed in the media are shaped by the societal 
values and norms of their time. This lends credence to the need for social and historical 
context when reviewing scientific controversies discussed in the media. The study also 
found that reporters tended to quote the same types of experts and claimsmakers when 
reporting on science controversies. 
 
While investigating the relationships between journalists and their sources in 
constructing media controversy, Nisbet et al. (2003) showed that government sources 
and societal elites, including scientists, are more likely to influence the agenda setting 
and framing of an issue. Past studies do indeed point to government officials and 
scientists dominating as sources in U.S. media coverage (Nelkin, 1995; Nisbet and 
Lewenstein, 2002). Furthermore, investigation into sourcing practices has shown that 
journalists chose scientific experts based on the criteria of being relevant to the 
audience, their visibility in their field and in the public eye, as well as their accessibility 
(Rothman, 1990). Two German studies, which matched scientists and journalists who 
had contact with each other, found a strong “co-orientation” between the two camps, 
except when it came to issues of control over communication (Peters, 1995; Peters and 
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Heinrichs, 2005). This suggests that there can be an alliance between journalists and 
scientists, which is fragile when issues of control over communication to the public arise 
– a situation in which journalists would naturally want to maintain power.  
 
A study by Allgaier et al. (2013) on the perceptions of German and U.S. neuroscientists 
towards journalists found that these scientists saw their interactions as beneficial to 
gaining public visibility for their research. Allgaier et al. (2013) also reported that the 
interviews conducted with neuroscientists showed “little evidence of strong conflicts 
between scientists and journalists.” One of the tensions noted between these two groups 
was the quality or accuracy of coverage that may lead to a biased or sensationalized 
representation of this field, according to the authors. Overall, the common thread in the 
interviews by Allgaier et al. (2013) was that neuroscientists today understand more 
about journalism norms and processes than their predecessors and that they tend to use 
their media knowledge as a competitive edge to advance their own standing in their 
professional organizations.  
 
A study by Brewer et al. (2014) on the frames journalists in Canada and the U.S. used in 
the controversy over health concerns associated with Bisphenol A (BPA) found that 
journalists from the Globe and Mail relied heavily on science framing from government 
sources (largely from a report by Health Canada and Environment Canada that 
recommended the classification of BPA as a toxic substance) (Brewer et al., 2014). The 
U.S. newspapers included in the study were the New York Times, the Washington Post 
and the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Journalists from all four newspapers emphasized 
the health concerns associated with BPA in keeping with the academic studies by 
scientists referring to health concerns associated with BPA. In Canada, policies were put 
in place to address the health issue that largely served to resolve the controversy in the 
media when the government issued a ban on the use of BPA in 2008. This study points 
to the alliance between journalists and scientists to oppose industry interests (i.e. in the 
continued use of BPA).  
 
Jensen (2010) studied the frames used in the reporting on human cloning to underscore 
the failure of the fourth estate – the failure of science journalists to uphold the journalistic 
ideal of acting as a watchdog when it comes to the coverage of human cloning (Jensen, 
2010). He concludes from his own research along with a literature review of other 
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research done on the media coverage of human cloning that there is a pattern of 
journalistic credulity. He charges science journalists with a tendency to give into the 
hype surrounding scientific developments and the failure to be skeptical of and challenge 
powerful institutional norms (Jensen, 2010). This again suggests that journalists tend not 
to challenge scientists when reporting on science, which may allow scientists to over sell 
the impact or importance of their work. What would compel science journalists to react in 
this manner? One reason could be that scientists are becoming more active in 
publicizing their views and opinions. 
 
A review of science journalism today by Sharon Dunwoody notes that scientists are 
becoming more media savvy and are now more active in contacting the public directly 
(Dunwoody, 2008). This changes the communication playing field as journalists and 
scientists engage in creating what British researchers Blumler and Gurevitch (1981) 
termed a “shared culture” where the two fields acknowledge that they need each other 
and so create a space where they can collaborate to achieve their own goals 
(Dunwoody, 2008).  
 
In a study of the controversy over the MMR vaccine and its supposed link to autism, 
Boyce (2006) investigated how journalists use “expert-sources” and how scientist 
sources presented themselves in the publicized debate. He also examined how both 
groups influenced the way the story was reported and received. In this instance, the 
author notes that often journalists chose to “balance” their coverage by pitting expert-
sources against non-experts (most commonly politicians). This further highlights the 
need to investigate how these three camps interact in the face of science policy 
controversies. Boyce also notes that journalists often choose sources based on their 
news values, editorial agenda, time pressures or to provide “objectivity” or “balance” to a 
story. Further research by Mikulak (2011) into the MMR vaccine-autism controversy 
looked at the different ways knowledge is acquired. She notes that in this controversy 
many scientists blamed media coverage of the initial study published in the medical 
journal the Lancet (which was later retracted) as driving the decision by parents to not 
immunize their children. Mikulak notes that in this instance, scientists and journalists 
acted in opposition to each other as blame was placed on the media for ‘distorting’ the 
science used to legitimize what most scientists believe to be a false claim. She states 
that “scientists wariness of science reporting reveals the fundamentally different 
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methods by which scientists and journalists engage in inquiry.” Certain media coverage 
of this controversy showcases “some of the journalistic conventions that are thought to 
contribute to scientific controversies,” according to Mikulak. She notes that the 
journalistic approach to achieving balance in reporting can represent an “all-sides-are-
equal” approach that “ultimately does not provide the public with a full representation of 
the context surrounding the scientific issue at hand.” In this controversy, Mikulak 
concludes that scientific and journalistic practices interact in a way that contributes to a 
fragmented and contradictory public discourse.  
  
In an investigation into how the debate on climate change became publicized, Aykut et 
al. (2012) performed a content analysis of three French newspapers (Le Monde, 
L’Express and Sud Ouest from 1987 to 2007) and two leading French channels (TF1 
and France2 from 1997 to 2006) as well as conducted interviews with key actors from 
various fields who are implicated in the framing of the climate change issue. The key 
actors that the researchers identified are scientists, politicians, journalists and non-
government organization (NGO) activists. The authors characterize the climate change 
controversy as one that yields media, scientific and political capital. They looked at the 
rise of climate change as a controversy and identified three phases that occur in 
succession in the evolution of this controversy in the media. The first phase is 
characterized by the authors as a science controversy couched in language of 
uncertainty in keeping with the cautious stance by climate scientists who were wary 
about drawing hasty conclusions on the issue. Political action was nonetheless called for 
in this early phase. They found that in the first phase when climate change was coming 
to the fore in the media in France, scientists played a seminal role in legitimizing 
environmental journalists in their newsrooms. The political system in this phase is 
characterized by the authors as a body that categorized the issue as a problem of 
international relations with little bearing on domestic politics. In the second phase, focus 
in the media appeared to shift to highlight the dramatic consequences of climate change. 
The paper also points to complicity between the two camps of journalists and scientists 
in the second phase as both groups united to promote lifestyle changes in the public’s 
daily practices to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The interviews conducted by 
the authors shows a shift in journalists’ treatment of the issue that coincides with a 
change in attitudes among French environmental scientists. Opposition to scientifically 
driven “environmentalism” appears to come from a minority of scientists and political 
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agents, according to the authors. However, dissonant voices were given less media 
attention in the second phase of this controversy. The paper stresses that environmental 
journalists and scientists took ownership of the issue and worked to restrict the access of 
the opposition to public discourse. The authors conclude by hypothesizing a third phase 
in the climate change debate where new actors emerge (e.g. scientists who contest the 
claims as to the extent of harmful consequences of climate change) as well as new 
themes (e.g. impacts of the climate change debate on the science-policy relationship). 
From a journalistic perspective, the authors note that climate change is a high-profile 
controversy that now includes ownership by journalists who specialize in political, social 
and economic fields instead of remaining the sole domain of science/environmental 
journalists. The authors view the unfolding of this controversy as a struggle over the 
ownership and framing of the debate as a public problem.      
 
Science and policymaking interface 
The research presented in this section detail studies that examined the interaction 
between scientists and political agents in the context of publicized scientific 
controversies. 
 
A survey of 378 stem cell scientists in the U.S. in 2006 showed that many of these 
scientists were considering leaving their posts to pursue their research in other countries 
or other states, such as California, that are investing in the field after the human 
embryonic stem cell research controversy prompted policymakers to impose funding 
restrictions on this field of study in several states (Levine, 2006). Significant media 
coverage of the “brain drain” is a factor that is credited with shedding light on the issue of 
restrictive policies that have incited stem cell researchers to move to more favourable 
research climates. The role of media coverage, however, is not extensively considered 
in this study by Levine (2006).  
 
In an empirical study of the debate over whether exposure to electromagnetic fields 
(EMF) had adverse health effects, Spruijt et al. (2015), presented 32 EMF experts with a 
list of 38 statements. EMF experts could either agree or disagree with the statements 
and based on their choices the authors determined if there were different roles that 
these experts play when they provide policy advice. EMF experts were chosen based on 
a structured nominee process and 47% provided policy advice as their main task. 
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Experts (European, American and Australian) were primarily from the fields of 
epidemiology, public health, toxicology, risk assessment, biology and risk 
communication. The statements included in the questionnaire were compiled based on a 
pilot study, literature review and input from colleagues working in the EMF domain. The 
authors found that in this controversy, the degree of uncertainty for this issue as 
assessed by experts is highly associated with their role. In this particular controversy, 
the authors note that current policy is provided “against a background of scientific 
uncertainty,” which they argue allows for a “certain degree of subjectivity” and that policy 
advice given by experts as a result may be influenced by personal opinions, values, 
worldviews and the larger social-cultural context. The expert roles identified by the 
authors were: early warners, pro-science experts, status quo experts and issue 
advocates. Early warners disagreed with current policy. Pro-science experts called for 
evidence-based policies and generally wanted to monitor the risks before proceeding. 
Status quo experts agreed with current policies and did not advocate for additional 
regulatory measures. Issue advocates pushed for scientists to interact with policymakers 
and stakeholders – they saw no value for explaining the differences of opinions between 
experts on the issue of EMF. This latter category of experts is the only one where 
experts felt that the public should be involved in the advisory process, according to the 
authors. In this paradigm, early warners appear at odds with political agents while the 
other three categories (pro-science, status quo and issue advocates) were more or less 
in line with policymakers, depending on their stance on the issue.       
 
In an exercise to help improve the “mutual understanding and effectiveness of those 
working at the interface of science and policy,” Sutherland et al. (2012) conducted a 
collaborative process among 52 participants with both science and policy backgrounds 
that included participants from government, non-governmental organizations, academia 
and industry. The authors noted that science-policy relationships are at times difficult 
and occasionally erupts in controversy that makes this disconnect ever more visible due 
to debates on scientific issues or on the relationship between these two camps, or both. 
Participants consulted with colleagues and submitted questions to be voted on. A total of 
239 key unanswered questions were submitted by participants on the relationship 
between science and policy. These were distilled to 40 questions identified through 
voting. The final list included questions about “the effectiveness of science-based 
decision-making structures; the nature and legitimacy of expertise; choices among 
	 14	
different sources of evidence; and ways in which policy and political processes affect 
what counts as authoritative evidence.” Sutherland et al. (2012) note that although the 
importance of using science for public policy making has long been recognized, there is 
no consensus on how this can best be achieved. They also note that “evidence-based 
policy” has become a desired norm which has led to a “greater embedding of scientists” 
in policymaking processes. The authors suggest that “we need to ask not just how 
science can best inform policy but also how policy and political process affect what 
counts as authoritative evidence.” Sutherland et al. conclude that the questions put forth 
by participants allude to a “maturing appreciation of complexity and mutual 
interdependence in these relations; [and] of the value and ubiquity of science in 
contemporary policymaking.” Although this research yields some common ground held 
between scientists, policymakers and agents that play both roles, it does not examine a 
specific controversy.  
 
 
Journalism, science and policymaking interactions 
The literature detailed in this section presents studies examining the interaction between 
journalists, scientists and political agents in the context of scientific controversies. 
 
Ceccarelli (2011) examined three cases that “have been identified by scholars as 
‘manufactured’ scientific controversies” where political gain is sought by delaying or 
promoting public policy. According to the author, this is achieved by exploiting 
journalism’s balancing norms and making appeals to the public’s democratic values to 
suggest ongoing scientific debate exists in matters for which there is “overwhelming 
scientific consensus.” The three cases examined in this paper are AIDS dissent (doubt 
shed on the link between HIV and AIDS), global warming skepticism and intelligent 
design (antievolution lobbyists seeking for creationism to be taught in schools). 
Ceccarelli states that “manufactured scientific controversy” is a specific category of 
controversy where “strategically distorted communication” is employed to spark debate 
for political gain. The author examines common arguments used in all three cases to 
manufacture controversy. She points to tactics used by political agents, such as 
recruiting/grooming “maverick/opposition” scientists to voice dissent and by exploiting 
journalism’s balancing norm – where “the appearance of objectivity” is achieved by 
assuming that there are two sides to every issue, necessitating the provision of both 
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sides with equal time and equal representation in public discourse. The author notes that 
these strategies give rise to misperception among publics that there is a lot of 
disagreement among scientists over issues where consensus exists among the vast 
majority. The dynamic presented in this paper that examines commonalities among 
three cases of scientific controversies is one where political agents (i.e. agents with an 
agenda to sway policy one way or another) are accused of using a few 
“maverick/mercenary” scientists and exploiting journalism norms to oppose a perceived 
consensus in mainstream science.       
Likewise, Clarke (2008) investigated the impact of the balancing norm in journalism on 
the controversy over the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine’s supposed link to 
autism in children. The author does not discount the value of the journalistic balancing 
norm but calls into question how this norm is interpreted by journalists – as quantity 
(equal time/weight given to both sides in a debate) instead of as quality of different 
viewpoints. Clarke examines the claim that balanced reporting created a skewed view 
among publics on an established consensus in the scientific community. He examines 
coverage of this controversy in British and American newspapers as a case study to 
investigate this claim. A total of 279 articles (72 from U.S. newspapers and 207 from 
British newspapers) were examined between 1998 and 2006. When the controversial 
paper that sparked this debate was first published in the Lancet in 1998, journalists had 
to report on a controversial issue before a scientific consensus had taken shape. Clarke 
looks at the consequences when the media continued to hold to the balancing norm 
even after a consensus did emerge. The author claims that by covering both 
perspectives in the interest of balance, journalists may have instead sacrificed accuracy 
to promote a view among publics that the epidemiological evidence was in fact uncertain 
despite a “preponderance of scientific evidence” of a consensus to the contrary. The 
author found that although there was coverage that adhered to the balancing norm, 
there was also much coverage that focused on only one perspective (pro- or anti-link). 
He also notes that the balancing norm tells only part of the story of how this controversy 
gained traction. The autism-vaccine link story emerged at the same time as the Mad 
Cow Disease debate. In the latter case, both the government and mainstream science 
initially denied the link between beef consumption and a potential risk of Mad Cow 
Disease. Thus, publics were sensitive to the idea that the government and scientific 
experts could potentially be wrong. Against this backdrop of skepticism for public policy, 
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British newspapers provided much more emphasis for the pro-link between autism and 
the MMR vaccine, which may have helped cultivate the belief that there was equal 
division on the issue among scientists. In this instance, the paper presents a controversy 
where mainstream scientists and government political agents are in solidarity and are 
pitted against a minority of scientists and activists who gained media access through 
journalists exercising the balancing norm, which helped them propagate a viewpoint that 
was deemed unsubstantiated by scientific consensus.  
An examination by Palfreman (2006) of the debate on whether power line 
electromagnetic fields (EMF) causes diseases, such as cancer, sought to explore the 
challenges faced by scientists, policymakers and citizens when dealing with a complex 
case study of scientific controversy. The story of the potential link was first broken by a 
journalist who also helped to keep the controversy afloat in the media through his 
continued reporting and published books. The author observes that the debate among 
scientists to find consensus on the existence of this link and growing public concern 
ultimately put a burden on policymakers on what action would best serve the public. 
Palfreman details the “precautionary principle” model that dictates when “the uncertainty 
is large, the potential public consequences significant, and the proposed changes 
relatively inexpensive,” that precautionary action be taken. He notes that this is relatively 
uncontroversial when the cost of precautionary action is low. He also presents a version 
of this model called “prudent avoidance” that “argues that if, for a modest cost increase, 
reasonable changes can be implemented that will reduce an alleged toxin, then such 
changes should be made even before there is solid scientific evidence supporting a 
causal link.” Unfortunately, the remedial action required in the EMF controversy proved 
to be quite costly. The author notes that policymakers in this controversy had to contend 
with political as well as engineering realities. Prohibitive costs aside, by taking 
precautionary action, the political benefit is that policymakers appear to be taking action 
in the public eye but on the other hand, the risk is that the wrong message may be sent 
to the public that a real threat exists when there may not be one. In this case study, 
Palfreman presents a controversy that began with a journalist and epidemiologists who 
legitimized a controversy that was later quashed by the larger scientific community and 
policymakers. 
While past research on the interaction between journalism, science and policymaking 
provides pieces of the puzzle on how these fields interact in the face of controversy, 
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literature is scarce on the interactions of all three fields at once. The current research is 
an attempt to analyze the interface between scientists, science journalists and 
policymakers and tease out patterns of interaction that emerge in a climate of 
controversy. It is hoped that this will ultimately shed more light on how a science policy 




Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter outlines (a) the examples explored, (b) the theoretical approach to their 
exploration, and finally (c) a description of the methods used for their analysis. The 
thesis was focused on ‘opinion statements’ contained in articles from agents of the 
science, science journalism or political fields. Opinion statements are any written 
statements by an agent that expresses a value judgement pertaining to the controversy 
being debated. A qualitative analysis of the articles on science policy controversies helps 
provide a deeper analysis of the opinion statements when an agent from one field 
comments on the agents or activities of the agents from the other fields analyzed. Once 
patterns of interaction were identified and described, a historical construction of each 
controversy is presented to contextualize the patterns of interactions found. Next, 
Bourdieu’s conceptual triad of practice, habitus and social field was employed to provide 
a deeper analysis of the patterns of interactions identified. In this instance, each field 
was viewed in terms of their relationship to other fields in the context of each science 
policy controversy examined.  
 
Three examples of media discourse on science policy controversy were examined in this 
thesis – two historical and one contemporary. The discourse in the science policy 
controversies featured in the Science Forum was used to better situate and 
contextualize the contemporary controversy over the ‘muzzling’ of government scientists. 
 
A. The examples explored in this thesis: Historical controversies in the Science 
Forum and the government ‘muzzling’ of scientists on the CSWA website 
Example 1 and 2:  The Science Forum (historical examples) 
The first two examples analyzed were the discourses on the science policy controversies 
over building a national science policy and the development of environmental policy in 
the body of work published in the Science Forum from 1968-1979. These examples 
were chosen to ensure a degree of comparability between the historical and 
contemporary example.  
The Science Forum provides important, currently uncharacterized insights into science 
journalism, the coverage of science policy controversies, and policymaking in Canada in 
the 1970s. It is an example where Canadian science journalists editorialized their views 
and provided their opinions on the portrayal of science in the media. David Spurgeon 
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(former science writer for the Globe and Mail) served as the publication’s editor. The 
journal was published six times a year and received funding from various Canadian 
universities. In a statement of the journal’s editorial mandate, Spurgeon claimed that the 
purpose of the journal was to produce a publication in which scientists, policymakers and 
the public could discuss and debate the issues of science policy and the relationship 
between science and society (Spurgeon, 1973). Prominent science journalists at the 
time weighed in on the debates in the Forum, providing a rare glimpse into their opinions 
on how science should be conducted, viewed, used and mediated.  
The discourse on science policy controversies situated in the 1970s – exemplified by the 
discourse in the Science Forum – is an historical artifact that can be examined with a 
mind to contemporary debates and conflicts over the current, heavily critiqued state of 
science journalism (Nelkin, 1992; Dunwoody, 2014). Controversies over science and 
technology set in this period represent the “crisis of authority” that prevailed in the 
political realm of that time (Nelkin, 1992). As noted, Dorothy Nelkin expresses the 
concept that “controversies over science and technology revolve around the question of 
political control” (Nelkin, 1992). The Science Forum is a platform where debates or 
conflicts over science policy and the mediation of science are dominant themes (see 
breakdown of topics in Table 1). Controversy studies have played a prominent role in the 
sociological investigation of science since the 1970s (Mukerji, 2007). The scientists who 
weighed in on controversies at the time “looked for ways to advance their ideas, enroll 
allies in their movements, and promote their schools of thought” (Mukerji, 2007). 
Meanwhile, their critics looked for “fallacies in their arguments, flaws in their data, and 
reasons to doubt their approaches to problems” (Mukerji, 2007). Thus, the analysis of 
the controversies surrounding science policy in the 1970s lends itself well to the analysis 
of interactions between key players using Bourdieu’s conceptual triad of practice, 
habitus and social fields.  
Based on the breakdown of topics in Table 1, the controversy surrounding science policy 
and environmental hazards/pollution are included in this research project as they 
represent prominent controversies at the time and are topics that align well with the 
issues that surround the contemporary example examined (i.e. national science policy 
and climate change). This strategy also helps to provide boundaries to the investigation 
of this historical artifact. To ensure that opinions of agents were captured, this thesis 
examined editorials, comments and letters by science journalists, scientists and 
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policymakers that discuss these topics. These sections (i.e. editorial, letters and 
comment sections) are clearly designated spaces where opinions are expressed, which 
fits the criteria of the data required to meet the objectives of this research project (i.e. 
opinion statements).  
Table 1: Top 10 Topics Featured in the Table of Contents in the Science Forum 
(1968-1979) 
Topics Prevalence 
Science Policy 73 
Nuclear energy/power 43 
Medical/health science 43 
Environmental hazards/Pollution 35 
Science communication 30 
Ethics in science 23 
Nationalism 22 
Space exploration/satellites 20 
Alternative energy/energy crises  19 
Research funding 15 
Note: Topics are listed in order of prevalence (i.e. number of times it appears in the journal’s table 
of contents). 
 
Example 3: ‘Muzzling’ of government scientists on the CSWA website (contemporary 
example) 
The contemporary example examined in this thesis was the media discourse on the 
Canadian government’s ‘muzzling’ of government scientists. The controversy in this 
case refers to the Conservative government’s media policy that restricted government 
scientists who are publicly (i.e. government) funded from talking to journalists about their 
research (Birchard and Lewington, 2013). It is a topic that has been reported in print, 
online and on television. The controversy itself has mostly played out online where the 
voices of science journalists, scientists and policymakers have found platforms to 
communicate their concerns and messages to each other and the public. Research on 
climate change and on environmental issues appear to be the primary target of the 
muzzling (Huffington Post Canada, 2013).  
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To further delineate the boundaries of this topic, ensure that it is comparable to the 
historical example of the Science Forum and make the current study more manageable, 
online articles culled and presented by the Canadian Science Writers’ Association 
(CSWA) on their website were examined. This section of the CSWA website bears some 
key similarities to the Science Forum – it is a site hosted and curated by Canadian 
science journalists and features opinions by science journalists on the example 
controversy. This structural similarity helps make the contemporary example more 
comparable to the historical examples examined in the Science Forum. In addition, 
David Spurgeon – the editor of the Science Forum – led the CSWA in 1972 and was an 
original member of its former iteration as the Canadian Committee of the National 
Association of Science Writers (NASW) in 1961 (which he also chaired in 1963) (Visser-
deVries, 2015 http://sciencewriters.ca/3581627). This provides further linkages between 
the sources of data chosen. Articles that featured the opinions (i.e. op eds, blog posts) of 
agents from the science journalism, science and political fields were included in the data 
collection and analysis. The articles culled and curated on the CSWA site originate from 
mainstream online newspaper sites as well as political blogs and science blogs.  
 
The CSWA had a page dedicated to the muzzling of government scientists: 
http://sciencewriters.ca/initiatives/muzzling_canadian_federal_scientists/. The page was 
updated on an ongoing basis until March 2016 to include the latest developments in this 
story as it unfolded as well as capture responses by science journalists, scientists and 
policymakers from news sites and social media platforms. After this point, the page was 
removed. An archived version of the page was used to cull the data captured and 
analyzed in this thesis.  
 
B. Theoretical approach 
The theoretical approach used in this thesis is ‘Bourdieu’s conceptual triad’ of practice, 
habitus and social fields (Rawolle and Lingard, 2008). This triad represents the main 
“thinking tools’ in Bourdieu’s body of work (Bourdieu, 1989).  
 
Practice 
Bourdieu’s research is filled with accounts of social practices – scientific research, 
marriage strategies, visiting art museums and more. It is a foundational concept in his 
work and one that he was careful not to oversimplify. Bourdieu portrays practice as a 
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rich concept that encompasses activities that possess a social character and bears 
meaning. The details, structure and effects that define a practice are expected to 
emerge in the course of its study.  
 
Three interconnected aspects are used to define practice in this instance (Warde, 2004). 
Firstly, that a practice is the performing of an activity. In the case of this thesis, the 
practice under examination is the participation in media discourse on science policy 
controversies. Second, practice is the naming of an activity, which lends the practice 
social organization and boundaries. This does lend itself to this research as a ‘scientific 
controversy’ debated in the media is a bounded activity that denotes a familiar activity. 
Third, practice should unfold over a cycle of time that imbues it with structure, limits and 
meaning. The practice of participating in media discussions surrounding any particular 
scientific controversy will meet this criterion when there is a resolution in the topic (at 
least in the media) or if it dies out as new controversies arise and become the focus of 
the media. ‘Practice’ for Bourdieu constitutes a public activity that is open to scrutiny by 
other agents and is relational at heart. This is a definition that translates well to the 
debate on science policy controversies in the media. 
 
Bourdieu views ‘practice’ as distinctly social and not to be chalked up to mental states, 
ethically informed actions or rational decision-making. According to Rawolle and Lingard 
(2008), “Bourdieu suggests that knowledge of the intentions or mental states of other 
agents is tangential to the fit between agents’ actions and their contribution to broader 
practice.” He used the concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ to offer explanations of patterns of 
practice by agents engaged in a ‘practice.’ 
 
Habitus  
Habitus was developed in an attempt to account for the practices of people impacted by 
colonialism who adopted practices (cultural and economical) acquired in a pre-
capitalistic world (Bourdieu, 2005). According to Bourdieu, ‘practice’ can be theorized 
through the concept of ‘habitus,’ which identifies the impetus for actions by agents as 
predispositions that have roots in social history (Burkitt, 2002). ‘Habitus’ is a concept that 
dictates that agents have a socially developed capacity to act a certain way depending 
on a system of predispositions that guide them to do so.  
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Depending on their habitus, Bourdieu notes that agents act reflexively rather than 
rationally but these actions can be “controlled through awakening of consciousness and 
socioanalysis” (Bourdieu, 1990). Thus, different agents are predisposed to different sets 
of actions depending on their ‘habitus’ – scientists to a scientific habitus, politicians to a 
political habitus and journalists to a journalism habitus.  
 
One criticism of this idea of predispositions is that this alone cannot explain a certain 
practice. In other words, the concept of ‘habitus’ alone will not be adequate to explain 
why decision-makers support some policies and not others. To provide context and 
explain the stimulus behind the practice of agents who decide to act one way versus 
another, Bourdieu introduces the concept of ‘field.’  
 
Field 
Bourdieu defines a ‘field’ as “a network…of objective relations between positions 
[occupied by agents]” (Bourdieu, 2005). A field is a space within which a power struggle 
is waged and where agents are located. The positions of agents are determined by 
specific rules of the ‘field.’ ‘Fields’ represent a hierarchy where all are subordinate to the 
largest field of power and class relations. It may be applied to all literary, artistic, 
philosophical and scientific activity.  
 
The three fields examined in this thesis are science, science journalism and politics. In 
his construction of this theoretical instrument, Bourdieu proposes looking beyond the 
interactions between persons. Instead he proposes (using the example of a political 
historian and journalist interacting on a televised event on election night) “that when the 
historian addresses the journalist it is not an historian who speaks to a journalist…it is an 
historian occupying a determinate position in the field of the social sciences who speaks 
to a journalist occupying a determinate position in the journalistic field, and ultimately it is 
the social science field talking to the journalistic field.” Thus, the discourse on science 
policy controversy will not be viewed as a dialogue between a scientist, a science 
journalist and a politician but rather as an exchange between agents from their 
respective ‘fields.’ Essentially, it is one field speaking to another through their agents 
(Bourdieu, 2005).  
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It is also important to keep in mind that certain properties that are granted to agents in a 
‘field’ are not “linked to any intrinsic properties of the person but to the field of which he 
or she is a part” and constitutes what Bourdieu terms “an objective relationship of 
symbolic domination” of one field over another (Bourdieu, 2005). Returning to Bourdieu’s 
televised election night example, he proposes that “the statutory objectivity that is 
granted to the historian is not linked to any intrinsic properties of the person but to the 
field of which he or she is a part….” He goes on to state that “the fact that the journalist 
defers to the historian” as an impartial expert represents “an objective relationship of 
symbolic domination [of the social science field] over the journalistic field.” In turn, the 
journalistic field may “exert a symbolic domination over the social science field in another 
respect” – for instance, in terms of its ability to access the public.  
 
According to Neveu and Benson, “fields cannot be understood apart from their historical 
genesis and trajectory” (Neveu and Benson, 2005). This is why fields cannot be fully 
examined without also considering the concept of ‘habitus.’ If we view the concept of 
‘social class’ as a generator of social practice, then the action of social agents can be 
seen as a product of their membership to particular social groups. In this way, 
interactions between social groups identified by the researcher can be examined using 
the concept of ‘fields’ (Grenfell, 2012). However, instead of associating certain practices 
to particular classes, Bourdieu attempts to construct a model of social space that can 
account for the practices found within it (Grenfell, 2012). In this model of social space, 
‘social classes’ or ‘fields’ can be best defined not by their similarities but by their 
differences in observable practices.  
Bourdieu insists that examining the social space in which interactions take place is 
necessary to fully understand interactions between people. Simply examining what was 
said or an event or social phenomena on its own is not enough. Examining a social 
space entails locating an object of investigation in its specific context (i.e. historical, 
relational, local/national/international context) as well as exploring how past knowledge 
on the subject had been generated and what purpose this knowledge generation may 
have served or who it may have benefited (e.g. Bourdieu, 1993; 1990; 2004). In the case 
of this thesis project, the social space surrounding two past and one present day 
controversy is studied within its specific historical and relational context.  
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Critiques of Bourdieuian Analysis  
When employing Bourdieu’s concepts for analysis, it is important to examine their 
limitations so that outcomes can be presented accurately and are not over- or mis-
stated. One critique is that the methodological borders can be “fuzzy” (Grenfell, 2012). 
Where to draw the line in terms of where the field effect stops and starts can be difficult 
to determine. For example, in defining the social object of “life-long learning,” one has to 
consider that companies have divisions dedicated to staff development and public 
television programmes exist that also serve this purpose. So, it makes it difficult to define 
where the field of education starts and ends (Grenfell, 2012). 
 
Another critique is that there may be too many ‘fields’ to consider for a given social 
object. Back to the education example, the different ‘fields’ to consider can include the 
field of higher education, the education discipline as a field, the university, the 
department, the programme, etc (Grenfell, 2012). Limiting the ‘fields’ that are considered 
is a matter of necessity so that the object of study can be examined thoroughly without 
diluting data in an endless examination of too many fields.  
 
A common critique of field theory is that it is deterministic and puts too much focus on 
‘field logic’ and its ability to reproduce ‘field effect’ instead of changes that occur in a field 
(Grenfell, 2012). However, Bourdieu’s methodology does stress examining the historical 
genesis of a field and how it developed into its present form. This view necessitates a 
look at how a field evolved and changed over time. Drawing connections between fields 
can, nevertheless, pose a problem. Bourdieu insists on a hierarchy model and that there 
is always a dominant field connected to other fields that are subordinate. However, it 
may be difficult to show exactly how this domination plays out.  
 
It is important to remember that the conceptual triad of practice, habitus and social field 
provides a way to translate “practical problems into concrete empirical operations” 
(Grenfell, 2012). Thus, the conceptual triad is a historicized methodological tool that 
provides a particular view of social interactions. It is a scholastic device to help make 
sense of the social environment we live in and offers a particular view of social 
interactions. Although the people, practices and institutions in social fields do have a 
physical manifestation that can be studied, the ‘field’ itself is a concept with no 
equivalent physical manifestation (Grenfell, 2012). As a methodology and theory, it can 
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provide much useful insight but it is important not to cede it more explanatory power than 
as a particular view of social interactions through a Bourdieuian lens.   
 
Bourdieuian analysis can be a useful way to map social interactions and has been used 
by scholars over many different disciplines, including disciplines as diverse as fashion 
(Entwistle and Rocamora, 2006), research practice (Grenfell and James, 2004), reform 
of science education (Melville et al., 2011), food (Wood, 1996), questions of gender 
(McNay, 1999) and colonial literature (Smith, 2006). The process and methodology in 
these studies are rarely able to duplicate Bourdieu’s own analysis of fields as 
comprehensively as he did – owing to the wide range of knowledge of qualitative and 
quantitative methods required as well as the time and funding such an exacting 
endeavour entails. As such, my limitations as a researcher – who lacks advanced 
mastery of many quantitative and qualitative methods, and has limited time and funding 
at my disposal to conduct a thorough field analysis à la Bourdieu – necessitate 
modifications to my analysis to accommodate the capabilities and resources at my 
disposal. These modifications include looking at interactions between the fields of 
science journalism, politics and science without first constructing each field. Ultimately, 
my goal was to examine the interaction of agents from these three fields within a very 
specific context – the media discourse surrounding science policy controversies. I do 
examine ‘practice’ and ‘habitus’ for agents within these fields but only to capture their 
practices specific to the media discourses on the science policy controversies examined. 
The historical genesis of each ‘field’ remains outside the scope of this research project. 
However, the historical genesis of each science policy controversy chosen for this 
project is relevant and is examined. Ultimately, my overall goal was to determine if there 
are certain alliances or oppositions between these three fields in times of science policy 
controversy. Bourdieu’s conceptual triad is employed in an attempt to explain any 
patterns found in the course of my research.   
 
C. The methods used: thematic analysis and Bourdieu’s conceptual triad   
Following the methods of Bourdieu and Wacquant (1989) and Grenfell (2012), three 
examples of media discourse on science policy controversy were examined in this thesis 
– two historical and one contemporary. The contemporary controversy on the supposed 
gag order on scientists is an important one that affects the communication of science to 
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the public and represents the domination of the science and journalism fields by the 
political field. A similar pattern of struggle over power and authority between these fields 
may be observed in the discourse on various science policy controversies in the Science 
Forum. Ultimately, the debate over controversies featured in the Forum help us situate 
and better understand the contemporary controversy over the muzzling of government 
scientists. 
 
Data Collection and Inclusion/Exclusion of Articles 
All articles included from Examples 1, 2 and 3 represented media discourse on a 
particular controversy (i.e. national science, environmental pollution and science 
communication policies). Any articles that were simply descriptive of a scientific 
technology for example were not included. Statements voiced by agents who are not 
from the science, science journalism or political field were also not included as this 
remains outside the scope of this research project.  
 
Media discourse on scientific controversy typically represents a debate and debates 
necessitate agents representing different ‘fields’ to weigh in with their support for or 
opposition to the controversial topic. Thus, to ensure that this support or opposition was 
captured, only articles that count as opinion pieces of agents written from a first person 
perspective were included (i.e., letters, comments or editorials). The opinion statements 
found within these articles were then sorted by topic and by agent. The unit of analysis 
was the entire article (including the heading) and quotes that represented a judgement 
on the debate were captured. Opinion statements in this instance were value 
judgements made by an agent that directly related to a given controversy or the actions 
of other agents that affect the controversy being analyzed.   
 
To help anchor and clarify the data collection, the controversies were labelled to provide 
a discreet way to encapsulate a particular controversy. For instance, the controversy 
surrounding the building of a national science policy in Example 1 encompasses the 
debate around the creation of a ministry of science, the shift in research grant funding 
powers from science institutions to politically-controlled institutions and funding cuts to 
basic science. All these policy changes and actions were encapsulated under the label 
“national science policy.” The environmental pollution controversy over the development 
of the north and pollution from industrial activities is encapsulated under the label 
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“government environmental policy.” The controversy over the ‘muzzling’ of scientists in 
Example 3 that encompasses the closing of science libraries and various environmental 
research facilities as well as the science information release policy is encapsulated 
under the label “government science information policy.” See Table 2 for inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. 
 
Table 2: Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
Opinion statement must originate from an 
agent/agents from the science, science 
journalism or political field 
Opinions from agents in the industrial field 
or personal relations (PR) field 
Agents must be Canadian  Non-Canadian agents  
Agents from the science field who 
represent the physical and life sciences 
Agents from the social sciences and 
political sciences  
Articles clearly labelled as opinion, 
editorial, letters or personal blogs 
News articles and quotes of agents from a 
particular field within articles that were not 
written by said agent/agents (e.g. 
interviews of political agents by journalists) 
First hand statements clearly representing 
the value judgement of an agent/agents 
from a particular field 
Statements or matter quoted within an 
article that cannot be clearly assigned to 
the science journalism, science or political 
field 
 
Data Analysis  
Data in the form of opinion statements were culled from the included articles from both 
the historical examples and the contemporary example. Opinion statements in the 
relevant articles were sorted into themes of support or opposition, and thereby used to 
capture the value judgement of a given agent on a given controversy. A ‘neutral’ 
category was included as well to capture opinion statements that fit in neither category 
and/or are intended to signify neutrality. An opinion statement was categorized as 
‘support’ if the statement implied agreement for the policy and/or its consequences or 
reasoning that condoned a controversial policy already in effect (i.e. reduced funding for 
basic science, the closure of a science library or research facility, the creation of a 
science ministry, the implementation of restrictions on the release of science information, 
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etc.). An opinion statement was categorized as opposition (‘oppose’) if the statement 
implied resistance or disagreement for an existing policy or the implementation of a 
controversial policy. An opinion statement was categorized as ‘neutral’ if the statement 
discussed the controversial policy in question but implied neither support nor opposition. 
Together, this helped ensure that all opinion statements on the issue were captured and 
analyzed.  
 
The resulting data was analyzed first using a qualitative thematic analysis, which was 
adapted from Sandelowski and Barroso’s methodology for creating metasummaries 
(Sandelowski and Barroso, 2003a; 2003b). This method allowed for a qualitative 
analysis that was directed to the identification of patterns and themes that emerge from 
an observable frequency of occurrence (Sandelowski and Barroso, 2003a: 2003b). In 
this way, patterns were identified within each controversy and across controversies that 
helped clarify the alliances or oppositions between agents during a particular 
controversy and over all three controversies.  Effect sizes of identified themes were 
calculated and expressed as percentages by dividing the instances of opinion 
statements categorized in each particular theme by the total number of opinion 
statements captured overall. Calculating effect sizes in this way provided a means to 
ensure that findings were neither over- or under-weighted (Sandelowski and Barroso, 
2003a: 2003b).  Effect sizes were also calculated within fields. This was done by dividing 
the instances of opinion statements in each category representing ‘support,’ ‘opposition’ 
and ‘neutrality’ within each field over the total number of the opinion statements 
captured. This was done for each theme identified within a given controversy analyzed 
and then across all three controversies. In cases where the sample size was small, 
themes were expressed as the total numbers of opinion statements found.  
 
Next, to contextualize the patterns of interactions, a historical construction of each 
controversy was conducted using existing literature on and reviews of these 
controversies. The thematic analysis and opinion statements captured in this study were 
integrated into the historical construction to help situate the analysis done here into the 
broader historical genesis of the controversies under examination. Bourdieu’s 
conceptual triad of practice, habitus and social fields was then employed to provide a 
deeper analysis of the patterns of interactions identified. This historicized methodological 
tool provided a means to view each field in terms of their relationship to other fields in 
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the context of each scientific controversy analyzed – the recognized field of power in 
particular. This is ultimately political power and government (Grenfell, 2012). Although a 
strong hierarchy is at play within fields (i.e. dominant institutions with the power to direct 
the course of events and actions), there is still room for agency and change (Grenfell, 
2012). This is because a field is a human construction, and agents operating within it, 
use a set of beliefs and abide by a logic of practice that feels “natural” (Grenfell, 2012). 
Thus, agents occupying positions within the field understand the rules (i.e. the truths or 
doxa) within a field and stick to them. 
 
Each social field provides a means of accumulating ‘capital’ and converting ‘capital’ 
between fields (Bourdieu, 1985). Four types of ‘capital’ were considered: economic, 
social, cultural and symbolic (Grenfell 2012). ‘Economic capital’ refers to monetary 
wealth. ‘Social capital’ refers to access to beneficial networks. ‘Cultural capital’ refers to 
attributes derived from education, family and possessions (e.g. forms of knowledge, 
taste, aesthetic and cultural preferences, such as language and accents). ‘Symbolic 
capital’ refers to something that represents all other forms of capital and can be 
exchanged in other fields (e.g. credentials). All four forms of ‘capital’ can be used to 
acquire or “buy” better positioning. According to Bourdieu, the field itself is the site of a 
“game” where different agents use different strategies to maintain or gain a better 
position. The object of the game is to acquire ‘capital.’ The concept of ‘field’ is viewed 
alongside the concept of ‘habitus’ in order to form a more robust social analysis. In this 
stage, it is important to analyze agents in terms of relationships. Also, only attributes that 
relate to the ‘field’ in question are considered so individual idiosyncrasies do not come 
into play. The concept of ‘habitus’ then directs and positions agents within the ‘field’ in 
terms of the ‘capital’ they possess and how this helps position them – always abiding by 
the logic of the ‘field’ in question.  
 
Bourdieu’s conceptual triad allows interaction between individual agents and groups to 
be analyzed as well as the way in which one field interacts with another. According to 
Grenfell, in the course of this analysis, it is less important whether a qualitative versus 
quantitative approach is used (Grenfell, 2012). What is paramount is obtaining the best 
data analyses to construct a relational analysis of ‘fields’ and how they interact. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
This chapter presents the main findings from the qualitative thematic analysis that 
captured opinion statements from agents in the fields of science, science journalism and 
politics. Each section addresses one of the three examples explored by first reporting a 
characterization of each field before addressing the emergent themes. The chapter ends 
with a synthesis off all three examples.   
Example 1: Science Policy in the Science Forum 
In the Science Forum from 1968 to 1979 (78 issues) there were 89 articles found with 
opinion statements (i.e. editorials, letters and comment sections) by agents in the fields 
of science, science journalism and politics pertaining to the controversy surrounding 
national science policy. Table 1 presents the number of entries (i.e. individual articles) 
listed by field and indicates the agent’s support, opposition or neutrality for a “national 
science policy” – which is the statement used to represent the controversy over the 
government’s efforts to formulate a national science policy. The controversy surrounding 
the building of a national policy began with the debate over the creation of a science 
ministry and the implementation of a directive for research to target national priorities 
(i.e. mission-oriented goals). The controversy later encompassed the debates over 
policies that would effect changes in funding structures and amounts that went to public 
(basic) versus private (applied) science (see Chapter 5).     
Table 1: National science policy: Opinion statements listed by field  
Field  (Total) Position on “national science policy” 
Support Oppose Neutral 
Science (64) 3 58 3 
Science journalism (20)  16 4 




Scientists in the Science Forum were overwhelmingly opposed to the government’s 
national science policy (58 out of the 64 opinion statements captured). The majority of 
statements from science journalists also reflected the science journalism field’s 
opposition to this control (Table 1). While there are statements of neutrality from the 
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science journalism field, this was not very prevalent in the Science Forum. In addition, 
there were no science journalists that came out in support of the government’s national 
science policy. Statements from agents in the political field were few. The opinion 
statements that were captured and analyzed from this field showed that politicians were 
mostly in support of government science policy. The most prolific field for opinion 
statements is the science field. Opinion statements captured from this field also had the 
highest diversity of voices (i.e. from many different agents). The science journalism field 
yielded a more moderate number of opinion statements and had much less diversity of 
voices (i.e. statements came from a vocal but small group of prominent agents). Next, 
the position of each of these fields will be discussed in light of these findings.  
Science field 
Opinion statements from the science field in opposition to “national science policy” 
generally expressed broad opposition to any control of the science field by the political 
field, often due to a resistance to political authority over scientific autonomy that claims 
that government control will only serve to stifle scientific discovery. This is apparent in a 
statement on the dangers of bureaucracy from Gerhard Herzberg (National Research 
Council physics division and Nobel Prize winner3) who noted that “[b]ureaucratic control 
may be necessary for some government departments, but when applied to scientific 
laboratories it can only lead to the exodus of top-rate scientists and thus to mediocrity…. 
The greatest enemy of progress in science and technology in Canada is bureaucratic 
control” (Herzberg, 1970. The dangers of science policy to the creative scientist). 
A minority of scientists expressed opinion statements that were neutral or in support of 
the national science policy. Expressions of neutrality from the science field decried the 
effects of policies on science but did not take a clear stance in support or opposition of 
the policies. For instance, David Suzuki (professor of genetics at the University of British 
Columbia, host of CBC's 'Science Magazine' and CBC Radio's 'Quirks and Quarks) 
cautioned in his opinion column Viewpoint that to “weather the present funding crisis” 
scientists should not “react in a knee-jerk way” (Suzuki, 1976. Hazards of a public 
profile). Instead, he suggests that scientists “re-examine the fundamental concepts of 
science” and reasons that “the incredible power and weight of scientific application calls 
for a complete rethink of the way we train and do science." Here, Suzuki is expressing 																																																								
3 Titles for agents are drawn from the articles in the Science Forum and may change with time as agents 
move to different posts, gain credentials, etc. 
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his concern over the negative effects of science policies that called for funding cuts but 
at the same time he does not expressly condemn the attempt at political control over 
scientific endeavours. He extols the importance of science to society but also notes that 
the application of scientific discoveries holds much power and must be tempered by 
careful planning.   
Of the three scientists in support of a national science policy that calls for mission-
oriented goals, one was a mathematician and another a scientist from private industry 
who served on the editorial board of the Science Forum. In other words, neither were 
government or university scientists in the life sciences – the field where research funding 
cuts would be most felt. In fact, national policies that were debated could be construed 
as benefitting private (applied or industrial) science at the cost of public (basic) science 
(see Chapter 5). The third was scientist administrator Omond Solandt, Chairman of the 
Science Council of Canada (SCC) that advised the federal government on national 
science policy. Solandt’s statement sought to assuage the fears of scientists, noting that 
while the SCC supports the national policy for mission-oriented science, it would also 
serve as a buffer to ensure that basic (public) science would receive adequate 
government support: 
“Both the SCC [Science Council of Canada] and the OECD [Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development] are trying, by their advice, to achieve 
a better balance in our scientific community…. Once the wave of mission-
oriented programs gets well started, I have no doubt that the Science Council will 
find itself figuratively pushing on the other side of the pendulum trying to prevent 
it from going too far" (Solandt, 1970. The OECD report: achieving a better 
balance).    
 
Science journalism field 
The opinion statements captured from science journalists in opposition to a “national 
science policy,” which represents the stance of most science journalists captured in the 
Science Forum, generally mirrored the opinion statements of scientists as well as 
presented arguments that echoed those of scientists. For instance, the comment by 
science journalist Peter Calamai expresses his concern over political control affecting 
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scientific endeavours.  He notes: “There are obviously dangers in the government's 
present approach. Basic science could be distorted - or even destroyed - by a simple-
minded demand for instant economic payoffs, or by the application of rigid rules of 
relevance" (Calamai, 1971. Calculating the payoffs from basic research). His statement 
expresses his concern over the requirement for scientific research to be tailored to 
national economic goals. Likewise, science journalist Jeff Carruthers wrote that "Rather 
it is a question of just how much lay politics should and can, be allowed into the kingdom 
of science. …science and the general welfare can suffer when politics and science are 
mixed in the wrong proportions" (Carruthers, 1971. Politics vs science in the federal 
health department). 
These statements echo scientists’ opposition to policing of the science field by political 
agents and mirror scientists’ sentiments that political control will hamper scientific 
discovery. What science journalists sought to add to the argument against political 
authority over scientific autonomy is the idea that this approach is not in the best interest 
of the public. 
The neutral statements from science journalists were few and did not make an overt 
statement clearly in support or opposition of national science policies. For instance, in an 
editorial by the Editor of the Science Forum, David Spurgeon (science writer for the 
Globe and Mail) expressed the opinion that Canada is a nation that differs from others 
due to its “paternalism in scientific affairs,” adding that he would prefer more 
transparency in policymaking (Spurgeon, 1973. Searching for a Leader). 
No opposition statements to national science policies were captured from science 
journalists in the Science Forum.  
Political field 
There were very few opinions captured from this faction in the Science Forum although 
key players did sound off on the issues. For instance, the Deputy Minister of Finance, 
S.S. Reisman noted that although funding may not be at a level that scientists would 
like, all forms of research are nonetheless funded by taxpayers (Reisman, 1970. 
Reisman: no form of research is unsupported in Canada). 
Of the opinion statements in support of national science policy, one opinion statement 
captured from a politician and former industrial scientist, Frank W. Maine, Liberal MP for 
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Wellington (organic chemist and former R&D director of a Canadian manufacturing 
company and soon-to-be Minister of State for Science and Technology in 1977) spoke 
more on the stance the government and private (industrial) science should take. The 
statement of support for mission-oriented research goals (i.e. science targeted to 
national priorities to increase support to private science and industry) was not overt but 
was implied when he notes, "Obviously, industry must spend more, and the goal of both 
industry and government must be to translate more of this research into commercial 
products" (Maine, 1976. The Significance of the RCA Laboratories Closure). 
The Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Colleges and Universities, J. Gordon Parr also 
weighed in on funding cuts to basic science and lent his reasoning as to why the cuts 
were justified as well as the need for the evaluation of research to be funded. He argues 
that while avenues of research are limitless, funding isn’t, noting that, “unless the quality 
of research is appraised, the bucket has no bottom” (Parr, 1976. Could scientific R&D 
survive conserver society restraints?). 
There was one instance of opposition to government policy from a political agent 
(Senator J.A. Sullivan) but this was from a scientist who entered politics and so may be 
in fact be speaking as an agent of the science field. The senator in this case submitted a 
letter to dissociate himself from the senate committee and its recommendations on 
science policy (Sullivan, 1971. A minority of one in the Senate committee). 
Themes identified 
From the opinion statements captured on science policy, six themes emerged: 
1. Opposition to national science policies; 
2. Political involvement of scientists; 
3. Call for scientists to unite to oppose government policy;  
4. Observation of government inaction; 
5. Government misinformation or lack of information to the public;  
6. More funding needed for science.  
These themes represent prevalent ideas/stances expressed or arguments employed by 
agents in the fields analyzed here. While these are themes found specifically in this 
controversy, some themes are also found with some frequency in the other two 
controversies analyzed. 
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Theme 1 - Opposition to national science policies 
The major theme found among 84% of opinion statements captured is the opposition 
from the science and science journalism field for the government’s national science 
policy (91% of opinion statements from the science field and 80% from the science 
journalism field). The debate in the Science Forum over science policy encompasses the 
controversy over the creation of a science ministry, the directive to first identify and then 
fund only mission/goal-oriented programs, the transfer of authority to grant research 
funding from institutions in the science field to those under the control of the political field 
and overall government funding cuts to basic research (i.e. public science) from 1969 to 
1979. The different angles of the science policy debate all tie back to the main 
controversy over the creation of a national science policy that began in the late 1960s. 
The Science Forum itself was created in 1968 when the debate on a national science 
policy first began and was spearheaded by university scientist J.A. Morrison, Director of 
the Institute for Materials Research at McMaster University and David Spurgeon, then 
science writer for the Globe and Mail.  
Theme 2 - Political involvement of scientists   
A minor theme (21% of all opinion statements captured) that emerged was the 
suggested involvement of scientists in the political arena. Mostly scientists (27% of 
opinion statements captured from the science field) called for this sort of involvement. 
One example that illustrates a statement calling for more political involvement of 
scientists is by a geologist from Queen’s University who noted that "… scientists must 
play a dominant role in the formulation and execution of science policy.... The evolution 
of science policy has been labelled the 'science of science,' but a curious science it will 
become if scientists exclude themselves or are excluded from its ranks" (Wynne-
Edwards, 1969. How competent are scientists to judge science policy?). Another 
example comes from a chemist from the University of Ottawa: “It is disconcerting that the 
Senators feel that active scientists should play such an unimportant role in connection 
with science policy. […] It would not, indeed, be unreasonable for the deputy minister to 
be a scientist..." (Laidler, 1974. Lamontagne III: a serious fault). 
Science journalists on the other hand were mostly silent on the matter. When they did 
choose to comment, there was a split between support and opposition to this line of 
thinking. For instance, Lydia Dotto science writer for the Globe and Mail expressed 
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skepticism for the scientists’ ability to cope in the political arena, noting that "…outside of 
their scientific disciplines, scientists appear to have no greater expertise than anyone 
else in manouevering through the quasi-parliamentary wrangles …" (Dotto, 1973. 
SCITEC: still groping in search of a role?). 
There was also support from science journalist David Spurgeon (Editor of the Science 
Forum and Globe and Mail science writer) for scientists’ involvement in politics as he 
opined in an editorial entitled Why scientists must get into politics that scientific experts 
were in a better position than the public to pass judgements on how best to solve social 
problems, suggesting that policymaking requires the involvement of scientists 
(Spurgeon, 1971. Why scientists must get into politics).  
Opinion statements from politicians on the matter were not found.  
Theme 3 - Call for all scientists to unite in opposition   
A minor theme was a call almost exclusively from scientists for the agents from this field 
to act in unison to oppose the political push for national science policies (8% of opinion 
statements captured from the science field). These opinion statements called for all 
scientists (government or university and across all disciplines) to unite to oppose the 
government’s national science policy.  
Theme 4 - Observation of government inaction 
Likewise, the observation that the government was not taking action in terms of science 
policy making was a minor theme that emerged almost exclusively among scientists (8% 
of opinion statements captured from the science field). 
Theme 5 - Government misinformation or lack of information 
A theme that appears in all three controversies discussed – both past and present – is 
the accusation by agents in the science and science journalism fields that the 
government lacks transparency in its science policy decision making processes or 
provides misinformation to the public. In the controversy over the building of a national 
science policy in the Science Forum, this was a minor theme (12% of opinion 
statements) with more science journalists (20% of opinion statements from the science 
journalism field) implicated than scientists (9% of opinion statements from the science 
field). Science journalists were naturally concerned that the lack of transparency in 
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policymaking impeded their journalistic endeavours and ability to report on the issue to 
the public. For instance, Jeff Carruthers (Ottawa Journal and FP publications) 
commented on the decision to loosen the existing restrictions on information release 
policy in the science ministry, noting that “As an indication of how far the science 
ministry intends to go in this regard, the information will be made available to science 
journalists!"  (Carruthers, 1975. The science ministry takes on a new look). Here, 
Carruthers employs sarcasm to reinforce his observation that the ministry had not thus 
far been forthcoming with providing science journalists with information.   
A minority of scientists also echoed this concern, as evidenced by Peter A. Forsyth 
(Director of the Centre for Radio Science, University of Western Ontario) who opined in 
a commentary entitled Let's take the secrecy out of science policy that the Canadian 
public and scientists were growing “increasingly distrustful of technical decisions 
announced without public discussion” and “increasingly disenchanted with the secrecy 
surrounding these decisions” (Forsyth, 1972. Let's take the secrecy out of science 
policy). 
Theme 6 - More funding for science 
The call for more funding or the opposition to funding cuts was a common theme in the 
opinion statements captured among scientists (31% of opinion statements captured in 
the science field). Scientists opposed funding cuts often using the argument that this 
would end the careers of agents in the science field, noting that “….if the present trends 
continue, there may not be any academic research to administer within five years” 
(Morrison, 1974. Academic research: Down, perhaps on the way out) and that the cuts 
were “responsible for the destruction of several brilliant research teams” (Nyland, E. et 
al., 1973. Alberta physicists assess the Lamontagne report). 
Science journalists echoed the sentiment, blaming the federal government for actively 
participating “in the dramatic plunge of Canadian R&D during the previous decade…” 
and noting that the cuts have “harmed the future of research and development in this 
country to the point where it may never recover" (Carruthers, 1979. The Lord giveth and 
the Lord taketh away). Science journalists also noted that cuts were jeopardizing the 
careers of scientists, stating that budgets were tightened “to the point where some of the 
country's most talented scientists have been squeezed right out of the top of the purse" 
(Cohen, 1978. Canadian industrial "strength." R&D the weakest link). 
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Example 2: Environmental hazards/pollution in the Science Forum  
In the Science Forum from 1968 to 1979 (78 issues) there were 13 articles found with 
opinion statements (i.e. editorials, letters and comment sections) by agents in the fields 
of science, science journalism and politics pertaining to the controversy on 
environmental pollution policy. Table 2 presents the breakdown of opinion statements 
listed by field and notes the support, opposition or neutrality of these agents on 
“Government environmental policy.”  
Table 2: Government environmental policy: Opinion statements listed by field  
Field  (total) Position on “Government environmental policy” 
Support Oppose Neutral 
Science (6)  5 1 
Science journalism (6)  5 1 
Politics (1)  1  
 
Science field 
Opposition from the science field generally reflects the growing public concern over 
environmental issues in the 1960s and 1970s as evidenced by a comment from a 
McMaster University scientist: "The increased public awareness of the problems of 
pollution has provided an environment which allows government action at all levels” 
(Lock, 1969. A pollution control plan for co-operative action). Along with the recognition 
of environmental pollution as a growing public concern is the recurring critique of 
inaction on the part of the government. This observation of inaction is also combined 
with an accusation that the government itself is a contributor to environmental pollution, 
as we can see from the statement, “The reasons for this inaction seem to be complex 
but I suggest that administrative problems, the unwillingness to tell the taxpayer that 
action will cost money, and the fact that many government operations are themselves 
major polluters are the root causes" (Lock, 1969. A pollution control plan for co-operative 
action). 
Science journalism field 
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Science journalists in the Science Forum seem to be of the opinion that scientists have 
the expertise required to help resolve the issue but that the government’s lack of action 
or recognition of the issue is the main barrier to resolution. A comment by freelance 
researcher and writer, Jim Lotz provides an example:  "Politicians are only too keen to 
see scientists as parasites who spend huge sums of public money on trivial, academic 
enquiries. At the same time, they look to them to provide instant solutions to complex 
problems” (Lotz, 1974. A broker and buffer between government and people).  
There were minimal opinion statements that expressed neutrality on the issue of 
government environmental policy among science journalists in the Science Forum (1 out 
of 5 opinion statements captured in the science journalism field). While the data is 
limited, the issue appears more polarizing with few agents occupying a middle ground on 
the controversy over environmental pollution policies. The one instance of an expression 
of neutrality from a science journalist came from the editor of the Science Forum, David 
Spurgeon who did not condemn or condone government environmental policy but takes 
the opportunity to exonerate science from blame in the matter of environmental pollution: 
“The thing to do is not to condemn science and technology, but to strike a sensible 
balance" (Spurgeon, 1969. The eleventh hour on our last frontier). He goes on to echo 
the sentiment found in the opinion statements of other science journalists that science 
has the power to resolve the issue: “…we have an unparalleled opportunity to use 
science and technology to improve the quality of life rather than to debase it…".  
Political field 
In the one instance where an agent from the political field also opposed government 
environmental policy, it appears that the argument was meant to support the need for a 
science minister and called for science to serve national priorities or mission-oriented 
goals – something that agents from the science field generally opposed. MP David Lewis 
(MP, Ottawa) noted: "…our atmosphere and waterways are becoming dangerously 
polluted… it is the fault of the government in not assigning priorities in accordance with 
Canadian needs and aspirations, and thereby giving no direction to the great potential 
role of science and technology to the fulfillment of these needs" (Lewis, 1969. Without a 
science minister policy is haphazard). We also see from this comment a belief that 
science can resolve the issue of environmental pollution. 
Themes identified 
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Five themes emerged from the opinion statements on environmental pollution in the 
Science Forum: 
7. Opposition to government environmental policy 
8. Observation of government inaction on environmental pollution 
9. Government misinformation or lack of information on environmental pollution 
10. Belief in the ability of science to find solutions 
11. More funding for science related to environmental policy 
Theme 7 - Opposition to government environmental policy  
The theme of opposition to government environmental policy was strongest with 85% 
(11 out of 13) of opinion statements containing this theme. Mostly agents from the 
science (5 out of 6 opinion statements) and science journalism (5 out of 6 opinion 
statements) fields expressed this opinion. This controversy appears to be particularly 
polarizing with only 2 opinion statements expressing neutrality and none expressing 
support. 
Theme 8 - Observation of government inaction on environmental pollution 
Another major theme (10 out of 13 opinion statements) that arose was an observation of 
government inaction in resolving the issue of environmental pollution. This was found 
among agents in both the science (5 out of 6 opinion statements) and the science 
journalism (4 out of 6 opinion statements) fields. 
Scientists expressed an observation of inaction on the part of the government as can be 
witnessed in the comment of an ecologist from McMaster University: “But peering 
through the dust of political gymnastics one is forced to conclude that so far there has 
been very little tangible action" (Kershaw, 1971. Has the message got through?). 
However, there was less of an observation of inaction due to ignorance on the part of the 
government. 
Science journalists tended to echo this observation of inaction. For example, as in the 
comment by Calamai: “The unwritten rules of the government pollution game appear to 
be that no action is announced publicly until the problem reaches a crisis state” 
(Calamai, 1970. How governments play the pollution game). Agents from this field also 
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tended not to associate government inaction with ignorance and were more likely to 
assign blame to both government and government scientist administrators. 
Theme 9 - Government misinformation or lack of information on environmental pollution 
The theme that the government is providing misinformation or failing to provide any 
information to the public on environmental issues also emerged from the opinion 
statements captured. This was a minor theme (5 out of 13 opinion statements) among 
agents and came from both the science (3 opinion statements) and the science 
journalism (2 opinion statements) fields. Science journalist, Peter Calamai provides an 
example of this theme by writing “…the public is given only partial information, subjected 
to the worst type of propaganda about crash programs, and expected to relax with the 
thought that the job is in capable hands" (Calamai, 1970. How governments play the 
pollution game). 
This sentiment of misinformation or obstruction of information release by the government 
was echoed by scientists as well. David V. Bates (dean of medicine, University of British 
Columbia and chairman, Science Council study 'policies and poison') notes, "One can 
easily visualize a study of levels of body mercury contamination in native peoples being 
embarrassing to a provincial government and being excluded from obligatory publication 
on that ground” (Bates, 1977. Opening up governmental decision-making). Bates goes 
on to note that more bureaucratic control of the flow of information may be forthcoming 
but that he doubted this would provide the necessary transparency to inform the public.  
Theme 10 - Belief in the ability of science to find solutions 
The sentiment that the solutions to the environmental pollution issue would be found 
through scientific endeavours was a minor theme found in this controversy (5 out of 13 
opinion statements). This sentiment was found mostly among science journalists (4 out 
of 6 opinion statements in this field) with the exception of one science journalist who 
noted that “The problem is more than one of salvation or damnation by technology” 
(Lotz, 1978. Oil spills in the Arctic spell disaster).  
Theme 11 - More funding for science related to environmental policy 
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The call for more funding or an opposition to the loss of funding was a minor theme 
found among agents in the science and science journalism fields in the controversy over 
environmental policy with 2 opinion statements expressing this sentiment. 
Example 3: ‘Muzzling’ of government scientists 
The controversy over the ‘muzzling’ of scientists encompasses cuts to research funding, 
the closure of various research facilities as well as the science information policy issued 
by the Harper government. The opinion statements for this contemporary controversy 
were captured from the archived CSWA web page: 
http://sciencewriters.ca/initiatives/muzzling_canadian_federal_scientists/. In all, there 
were 20 opinion statements (i.e. editorials and opinion pieces) posted on this page or 
linked to this page. Table 3 presents the opinion statements of the agents listed by field 
and captures their support, opposition or neutrality related to “government science 
information policy.” In this science policy controversy, we see an equal number of 
opposition statements from both the science and science journalism fields. The sample 
for politicians is once again small.  
Table 3: Government science information policy: Opinion statements listed by 
field  
Field  (Total) Position on “government science information policy” 
Support Oppose Neutral 
Science (9)  9  
Science Journalism (9)  9  
Politics j2) 1 1  
 
Science field 
Scientists voiced their opposition to this policy with an accusation that the barrier to 
information release is due to the government’s industrial ventures as evidenced by the 
quote by Stephen Bede Sharper (Centre for Environment, University of Toronto), "While 
Canadian environmental scientists aren’t being placed under house arrest for their 
findings, they are it seems being silenced, “re-profiled” or downsized by a political power 
that is seemingly allergic to evidence that challenges its gospel of growth through the 
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mining and burning of fossil fuels” (Scharper, 2012. Are Canadian federal scientists 
being muzzled?). 
Scientists also spoke out on the persecution by politicians of scientists who did voice 
their dissent against the information release policy: "Minister of State for Science and 
Technology, Greg Rickford has continued the tradition of labelling scientists who speak 
up about science policy radicals and ideologues” (Taylor, 2013. Why don't cabinet 
ministers know anything about science?). In addition, scientists did comment on the 
silence of politicians on the controversy, for example, noting that “Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans Gail Shea is conspicuous by her absence in the national press” (Taylor, 
2013). At the same time, the idea that the Prime Minister was ultimately to blame for the 
information release policy and not the MPs was prevalent: “Our cabinet should not just 
be a group of talking heads spouting policy lines crafted in the PMO” (Stephanne Taylor, 
Oceanography, University of McGill). 
Science journalism field 
Opinion statements from science journalists were strongly in opposition to the science 
information release policy. The policy in this instance was perceived as one that 
hampered both scientists and science journalists directly from performing their 
respective functions. This sentiment can be seen in the comment by Kathryn O’Hara 
(CSWA president), “This message manipulation shows a disregard for the values and 
virtues of both journalism and science, and subverts timely disclosure and access to 
scientific data” (O'Hara, 2010. Canada must free scientists to talk to journalists). O’Hara 
also pointed out that this information barrier was a constitutional impediment to the 
public: “Access to scientific evidence that informs policy is not a luxury. It is an essential 
part of our right to know." 
In addition to the charge that the information release policy is an affront to the public’s 
constitutional right, journalists also alluded to the sentiment that the move is a promotion 
of an ideology by the government at the time. As Francois Cardinal (journalist, La 
Presse) notes “Ce musellement politique, qui a toutes les apparences d'un musellement 
idéologique, se traduit par une interdiction formelle de s'adresser directement aux 
journalistes, et donc au grand public qui finance pourtant leurs recherches” (Cardinal, 
2012. La censure). There was also a strong rally from the science journalism field for the 
abolition of the policy, “Il [Ottawa] doit libérer les chercheurs du huis clos dans lequel il 
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les confine honteusement. Bref, il doit réviser le protocole de communication qu'il 
impose à ses scientifiques." 
Political field 
The one instance of an agent from the political field opposing the government’s science 
information policy was from a Member of Parliament (MP), Stewart Kennedy who also 
belonged to the New Democratic Party (NDP) as opposed to a member of the 
Conservative party in power (Kennedy, 2013. Biting through the muzzle on science).  
The opinion statement captured from George Enei, Assistant Deputy Minister of 
Corporate Services and Chief information officer at Environment Canada lent support to 
the government’s science information policy, which includes the closing of scientific 
libraries. He noted that the move to close the scientific libraries was an attempt by the 
government to digitize information – as opposed to the destruction of scientific 
information (Enei, 2014. Modernizing the library system). Although there is a dearth of 
opinion statements from agents in the political field in this controversy, the opinion 
statement captured here is from a policymaker who had direct impact on the course of 
policymaking in this controversy.  
Themes identified  
Four themes emerged from the analysis of the third example: 
12. Opposition to government science information policy; 
13. Contemporary government misinformation or lack of information; 
14. Contemporary political involvement of scientists; 
15. More funding for contemporary science.  
Theme 12 - Opposition to government science information policy 
The main theme captured among the opinion statements was opposition to the lack of 
flow of information from government scientists to the media. Of the opinion statements 
captured, 100% of statements from the science journalism and science fields were in 
opposition. Science journalists and scientists were strongly aligned to resolve the issue 
in a joint effort to lobby for a reversal of the government’s information release policy, as 
we can see from this comment issued by the CSWA, “After several unsuccessful 
attempts to resolve this issue, our organizations — which represent science journalists 
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and communicators and scientists across Canada and around the world — have agreed 
to a joint campaign to push for timely and open access to federally funded scientists" 
(CSWA, 2012. Open letter to Prime Minister Harper. Prime Minister, please unmuzzle 
the scientists). 
Theme 13 - Contemporary government misinformation or lack of information 
A strong theme – perhaps unsurprisingly given the nature of this particular controversy – 
was the accusation by both science journalists and scientists that the government was 
providing misinformation or a lack of information to the public. Overall, 75% of opinion 
statements captured expressed this sentiment. Agents from the science (78% of opinion 
statements from this field) and science journalism (78% of opinion statements from this 
field) fields were equally likely to level this accusation. Journalists from the Toronto Star 
noted that "If the government hopes to win trust, it might strive for a level of transparency 
that doesn’t include, say, vaguely worded statements” (Toronto Star, 2014. The real 
concerns about Ottawa's 'libricide').  
Science journalists were critical of this information release policy as an effective strategy 
by the government to further their interests and warned that this move would drive 
science journalists and the public to rally against this policy, as evidenced by the 
comment “if the government thought that clamping down on the flow of scientific 
information would help their cause (whatever it may be) then they’ve really shot 
themselves in the foot. The more they squeeze, the more the science journalism 
community and the public in general will feel the need to raise the alarm" (Irving, 2012. 
Come talk to me: Un-muzzling government scientists). 
Opinion statements from scientists were likewise laden with accusations of government 
misinformation or lack of provision of information to the public, as seen in the comment 
“Canadians should continue to demand that the muzzle be removed from public service 
employees to ensure an open flow of communication between the public, the 
government and the experts who collect and understand the data” (Kerckhove and 
Phipps, 2013. The Open Data effect: a tool to keep governments honest). 
In light of the lack of government response to accusations to confirm or deny the 
‘muzzling,’ scientists also submitted proof to support their claims that the ‘muzzling’ was 
indeed an issue: "The Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada recently 
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released the first results of a survey of over 4,000 government scientists, 90 per cent of 
whom reported that they were prevented from speaking publicly about their scientific 
work” (Findlay and Dufour, 2013. Why Canada needs a science watchdog). Agents from 
the science field also lobbied for an investigation of the legality of this information 
release policy: “The evidence of muzzling is sufficiently persuasive to have prompted an 
investigation by the federal Information Commissioner into the legality of government 
communication policies, following a petition by the University of Victoria’s Environmental 
Law Clinic" (Findlay and Dufour, 2013. Why Canada needs a science watchdog).  
Associations of science journalists and scientists also collaborated to write open letters 
in opposition to the information policy as can be witnessed in this statement issued by 
various science and science journalism associations: "Après plusieurs années de 
dénonciations infructueuses, nos associations, qui représentent la communauté 
internationale de journalistes scientifiques et les chercheurs canadiens, annoncent par la 
présente le début d'une campagne au cours de laquelle elles uniront leurs forces afin 
d'obtenir un libre accès aux scientifiques fédéraux. (Mathieu-Robert Sauvé, président de 
l'Association des communicateurs scientifiques du Québec; Florence Pilon, présidente 
de l'Association science et bien commun; Arnold Amber, président de la Canadian 
journalists for free expression; Peter McMahon, président de la Canadian Science 
Writers' Association; Jean-Marc Fleury, directeur général de la Fédération mondiale des 
journalistes scientifiques; Gary Corbett, président de l'Institut professionnel de la fonction 
publique du Canada, 2012. Science - Liberté pour les chercheurs canadiens). 
Theme 14 - Contemporary political involvement of scientists 
A minor theme that reoccurred in the opinion statements captured was a call for 
scientists to enter the political arena. This theme was found only among the opinion 
statements of scientists with 56% of opinion statements from this field expressing this 
sentiment. Scientists who rallied behind the push by agents in the science field to see 
more of their numbers in the political arena cited the lack of scientific experience by 
policymakers as a significant problem. This can be seen in the comment: "the real 
problem is not that Stephen Harper appointed a science minister who doesn’t have a 
science background. It’s that there aren’t enough MPs with science backgrounds to 
begin with” (Gibbs, K. 2013. Where are all the MPs with PhDs?). Agents from this field 
argued that scientists were ideal candidates to practice evidence-based policymaking as 
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this is a core tenet of the science field: “…having more scientists actively engaged in 
politics will go a long way to improving evidence-based decision making in Canada. If we 
want politicians who will critically examine and weigh all the evidence, then why not elect 
more people who are trained to do this as part of their vocation?" (Gibbs, K. 2013. 
Where are all the MPs with PhDs?). 
Theme 15 - More funding for contemporary science 
The minor theme of a call for more funding for science or the opposition of funding cuts 
to science was found in the contemporary controversy. Although this theme was found in 
the other two controversies examined, only scientists in the contemporary controversy 
offered opinion statements that fell into this category (33% of opinion statements 
captured agents from the science field). Among the opinion statements captured in this 
theme was one that closely echoed those found in the Science Forum on the lack of 
funding for basic science and the opposition of diverting funding from basic science to 
fund private science: “…academic scientists are sending a message to Ottawa that, 
although its approach to science policy might be well-intentioned, shifting even more 
university research funding toward industry partnership programs is a myopic view of 
how science works — and is likely to backfire…basic research in Canada has begun to 
atrophy due to chronic funding neglect" (Neufeld, 2013. Blinded to science: The plight of 
basic research in Canada).  
Synthesis of data from all three controversies  
Table 4 groups the data from all three controversies capturing the positions of agents 
from the science, science journalism and political fields related to the government policy 
examples examined. Table 4 shows that agents from the science and science journalism 
fields are opposed to government policy that seeks to impose political authority over the 
science field. This synthesis of data further allowed the recognition of five meta-themes 
that cut across all three controversies (Table 5, which lists themes by controversy and 
field). These meta-themes represent a unique qualitative crystallization of the opinion 
statements from the three fields examined.  
Table 4: Opinion statements from all three controversies 
Field  (Total) Position on “government policy” 
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Support Oppose Neutral 
Science (78) 2 71 5 
Science journalism (35)  28 7 
Politics (9) 5 3 1 
 
Table 5: Meta-themes common to the three controversies examined 
Meta-theme Controversy (n-value of opinion statements of 
agents captured) 
Field 
A. Opposition to 
government science policy 
National science policy debate in Science Forum 
(n=89) 
Science (58) 
Science journalism (16) 
Politics (1) 
Environmental policy debate in Science Forum 
(n=13) 
Science (5) 
Science journalism (5) 
Politics (1) 
Government science information policy on CSWA 
website (n=20) 
Science (9) 
Science journalism (9) 
Politics (1) 
B. Political involvement of 
scientists 
National science policy debate in Science Forum 
(n=89) 
Science (17) 
Science journalism (2) 
- 
Environmental policy debate in Science Forum 
(n=13) 
- 




C. Observation of 
government inaction 
National science policy debate in Science Forum 
(n=89) 
Science (5) 
Science journalism (1) 
- 
Environmental policy debate in Science Forum 
(n=13) 
Science (5) 
Science journalism (4) 
Politics (1) 




misinformation or lack of 
information to the public  
National science policy debate in Science Forum 
(n=89) 
Science (6) 
Science journalism (4) 
 
Environmental policy debate in Science Forum Science (3) 
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(n=13) Science journalism (2) 
- 
Government science information policy on CSWA 
website (n=20) 
Science (7) 
 Science journalism (7) 
Politics (1) 
E. More funding for 
science 
National science policy debate in Science Forum 
(n=89) 
Science (20) 
Science journalism (5) 
Politics (1) 
Environmental policy debate in Science Forum 
(n=13) 
Science (1) 
Science journalism (1) 
- 






Table 5 shows that a major meta-theme of “opposition to government science policy” is 
common to all three controversies examined here with scientists and science journalists 
showing a correlation in positioning in the historical and contemporary examples. The 
accusation of “government misinformation or lack of information to the public” is a 
second meta-theme that cuts across all three controversies. Science journalists here 
appear to express this sentiment in almost equal numbers with scientists. To a lesser 
extent, the third meta-theme calling for “more funding for science” could be observed in 
all three controversies with agents from the science field leading the cause. This call for 
more funding for basic science was much more prevalent in the past controversies in the 
Science Forum compared to the current controversy on the ‘muzzling’ of scientists. A 
weaker fourth meta-theme calling for the “political involvement of scientists” was found in 
the controversy on national science policy in the Science Forum and in the 
contemporary controversy. The push for more scientists to enter the political arena came 
almost exclusively from agents from the science field with a couple of exceptions from 
agents in the science journalism field in the historical example. This theme was much 
more prevalent in the historical example compared to the contemporary controversy. 
Lastly, the “observation of government inaction” was a final weak fifth meta-theme found 
in the historical controversies in the Science Forum. This theme was found among 
agents in both the science and science journalism fields – although more scientists 
noted this observation than science journalists.  
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Chapter 5: Historical construction of past and present science policy 
controversies 
The overall goal of this project is to explore the possibility of certain alliances or 
oppositions between the three fields of science, science journalism and politics in times 
of science policy controversy. To accomplish this goal, a historical construction is 
important as it provides a look at the historical genesis of science policy controversies 
and helps us more clearly situate the current controversy of the ‘muzzling’ of scientists in 
its rightful place and not view it in isolation – abstracted from culture, politics and history. 
The thematic analysis in Chapter 4 is used here to support the historical construction of 
the science policy controversies under examination. This chapter presents this analysis 
before discussing the patterns of opposition and alliance between these fields in Chapter 
6.  
Bourdieu portrays ‘practice’ as a rich concept that encompasses activities that possess a 
social character and bears meaning. In the case of this thesis, the practice under 
examination is the participation in media discourse on science policy controversies. A 
‘scientific controversy’ debated in the media is a bounded activity that denotes a familiar 
activity. According to Bourdieu, ‘practice’ can be theorized through the concept of 
‘habitus,’ which identifies the impetus for actions by agents as predispositions that have 
roots in social history (Burkitt, 2002). ‘Habitus’ is a concept that dictates that agents have 
a socially developed capacity to act a certain way depending on a system of historical, 
social and cultural predispositions that guide them to do so. Different agents are 
predisposed to different sets of actions depending on their ‘habitus’ – scientists to a 
scientific habitus, politicians to a political habitus and journalists to journalistic habitus. 
The concept of habitus alone, however, is not enough to explain why agents support 
some policies and not others. The concept of field is needed to provide context and 
explain the stimulus behind the practice of agents who decide to act one way versus 
another. A field is a space within which a power struggle is waged and where agents are 
located. The positions of agents are determined by specific rules of the ‘field.’ According 
to Neveu and Benson, “Fields cannot be understood apart from their historical genesis 
and trajectory” (Neveu and Benson, 2005). Bourdieu attempts to construct a model of 
social space that can account for the practices found within it (Grenfell, 2012). Bourdieu 
insists that examining the social space in which interactions take place is necessary to 
fully understand interactions between people. Simply examining what was said or an 
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event or social phenomena in isolation is not enough. Examining a social space entails 
locating an object of investigation (in this case, science policy controversies) in its 
specific context (i.e. historical, relational, local/national/international context) as well as 
exploring how past knowledge on the subject has been generated and what purpose this 
knowledge generation may have served or who it may have benefited (e.g. Bourdieu 
1993; 1990; 2004). 
Past literature and reviews of the controversies on building a national science policy, 
implementing an environmental policy and the enforcing of an information release policy 
were used to reconstruct these controversies. Opinion statements from the Results 
Chapter (Chapter 4) were used to supplement the historical constructions of each 
controversy.   
Historical construction of the controversy over a national science policy 
Traditionally, Canada has had a resource-based economy. Efforts have been made over 
the decades to transform this to a knowledge-based economy that “would be sustainable 
in the face of massive globalization” (Halliwell and Smith, 2011). Research, science and 
technology were the areas identified as drivers that would help attain this goal. Thus, 
science policies historically have been directed at re-aligning Canadian science and 
research systems to meet national priorities. A slew of Royal Commissions and 
innovation strategies at the federal and provincial levels have historically generated 
much debate mainly between policymakers and scientists as related to this goal (e.g. 
Science Council Report No. 4: Towards a National Science Policy for Canada, 1968; 
The Lamontagne Commission, 1968-1977; National Advisory Board on Science and 
Technology, 1995; Expert Panel on Commercialization, 2006; Innovation Canada, 2011).   
Canada’s science and innovation systems have a strong British heritage and is 
supported by an extensive university sector. The original core organization for 
government science in Canada is the National Research Council (NRC) which was 
founded in 1916 (Halliwell and Smith, 2011). The NRC’s design and function has its 
origins in the British Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and was the first 
official science policy institution. Science only became systematically organized in 
Canada in 1917, which arose when the Canadian government sought to establish formal 
policies regarding science in an effort to apply science to the wartime effort in the First 
World War (Holdsworth, 2002; de la Mothe and Paquet, 1994). This ran parallel to a 
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similar effort in England where the Haldane report to Parliament in 1916 sparked reform 
to government science. The philosophy of the Haldane report had a strong influence on 
the conception and organization of the NRC in Canada. The Haldane principle upheld a 
particular ideal of scientific practice that dictated that the “best scientific results are 
achieved when the community of scientists is left to its own discretion to allocate its 
resources internally in such a way as to optimize its production of knowledge” 
(Holdsworth, 2002). This may not be the only or first point in time where the idea of 
scientific autonomy took root but it represents an instance that is particularly salient for 
the historical construction of the science policy controversies examined here.  
One of the first tasks of the NRC was to survey industrial research in Canada, the results 
of which showed that industrial research was still performed on a very small scale and 
employed very few researchers (Thistle, 1966). Thus, the NRC decided to form an 
alliance with the universities. The idea of constructing institutes for industrial research on 
university campuses was initially entertained until a parliamentary sub-committee 
discovered that most university faculties were adamantly opposed to collaborating with 
industry (Lamontagne, 1970). Dr. A.R. Macallum, the NRC’s first chair, agreed with the 
universities disinclination to form partnerships with industry and persuaded the 
government to instead construct a laboratory complex for the research council that 
would develop new technologies for Canada (Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 2001).  
In the 1930s, the NRC took on its own autonomous research projects and gained control 
over the distribution of government grants to academic research projects. Between 1916 
and 1939, the NRC grew from one full-time employee and an annual budget of $91,600 
to 2,000 employees and an annual budget of close to $7 million within months of the 
start of the Second World War (Lamontagne, 1968-77). The structure and function of the 
NRC as an institute upheld the Haldane principle of scientific autonomy and had a 
mandate to coordinate Canadian science efforts. Yet, its mission was to serve as an 
advisory board to the Privy Council. This harbored a fundamental tension between 
scientific autonomy and government coordination that would serve as the core of the 
science policy debate that played out in the Science Forum (Holdsworth, 2002).  
Dr. E.W.R. Steacie who ran the NRC from 1952 until 1962 focused on stabilizing 
Canada’s universities as he believed this path would best serve the needs of industry in 
the long term through the provision of researchers and basic research to feed the 
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development pipeline (Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 2001). For Steacie, it was imperative 
that Canada build a critical mass of scientists on par with Britain and the USA – not to 
emulate them but in order for Canada to transcend its colonial status and gain more 
independence (Steacie, 1965). Under his presidency, Steacie stated that the NRC strove 
“to be as similar to a university laboratory and as unlike a government department.” 
There was also a tendency until the 1960s for top-tier Canadian scientists to hold 
interlocking positions of power in government and university sectors (Atkinson-Grosjean 
et al., 2001). Government science was at this time in large part the enterprise of a small 
elite group of scientists (e.g. J.W. Dawson, J.H. Grisdale, Charles Camsell, C.J. 
Mackenzie and E.W.R. Steacie). These men generally shared similar socio-economic 
backgrounds: Canadian-born of British ancestry, middle-class in origin and Protestant. 
They personally knew “everyone that mattered” and the scientific research field was 
relatively small and close knit. This network depended as much on shared social capital 
as it did on academic or scientific capital (Bourdieu 1969; 1988; Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 
2001). For most of Canadian history, science policymaking was personal and tended to 
function on a “social capital” system. Thus, decisions were made on the basis of whom 
one knew.  
This situation began to be questioned in the 1960s as the personalist system started to 
be criticized as corrupt and inefficient (Glassco, 1962). This sentiment is echoed in the 
Science Forum as can be seen in an editorial: “…many Canadian scientists and 
engineers felt that vital decisions were being made by a few people in government, 
sometimes without all the pertinent facts, sometimes under the undue influence of a 
small élite in a real or imagined Canadian scientific establishment” (Science Forum, 
1973. After six years: New needs, new responses).     
Under the Diefenbaker Conservatives, the Glassco Commission spanned a general 
election and reported to Lester Pearson’s Liberal administration in 1962. In the 
commission’s view, the NRC had placed too much focus and resources in the university 
grants program. The commission also accused the university grant program members of 
having vested interests, neglecting national policy goals and compromising its 
impartiality as a government advisor by operating its own laboratories, as well as failing 
to promote industrial research (Glassco, 1962). These accusations of incompetence, 
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neglect and partiality sparked protests from NRC’s scientists and bureaucrats who rose 
to the defense of this institution.  
Despite this tension, the NRC continued with its function to fund and support basic or 
public science until the 1960s. There was a post Second World War emphasis on 
economic growth that also drove a realignment of universities to accommodate returning 
soldiers (Holdsworth, 2002). The Canadian science community was part of the 
expansion of the whole university system. While scientific autonomy continued to thrive 
in the new scientific and education institutions, the sheer size of the investment called for 
renewed efforts to coordinate Canadian science – federal expenditures devoted to R&D 
grew from an estimated $5 million in 1939 to over $200 million in 1959 (Lamontagne, 
1968-77).  
‘Science policy’ as a notion entered the realm of public deliberation in the 1960s. Also, in 
light of demands that decisions follow ‘scientific’ methods complete with rational 
justifications, the personalist system went behind the scenes (Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 
2001). This can be glimpsed in a commentary in the Science Forum: "The core is just 
three men - Jim Davey, the prime minister's program secretary, Dr. Pierre Gendron, 
president of the Pulp and Paper Research Institute of Montreal, and Dr. Jim Harrison, a 
former president of the Royal Society who is assistant deputy minister for science and 
technology in the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.... these three have had 
the prime minister's ear at far closer range than the Science Council of Canada, Senator 
Lamontagne, or even some say - the Science Secretariat" (Calamai, 1971. Trudeau's 
technocrats telegraph their punches). Thus, the story of Canadian national science 
policy is in large part the story of the people who made it.  
The Glassco Commission of 1962 recommended a permanent Science Secretariat to 
advise the government, a Science Council to coordinate long range planning and the 
appointment of a science minister (Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 2001). In 1964, the Science 
Secretariat to the Privy Council was established to reconnect science to political power. 
In 1966, the Science Secretariat was transformed into the Science Council of Canada 
(SCC) with a mandate to serve as scientific policy advisor and under the leadership of 
Omond Solandt, the Council had influential access to the centre of political power (de la 
Mothe, 1992). As the SCC’s first chairperson, Omond Solandt had enjoyed a 
distinguished career in Canadian science and had served on the defense research 
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board during the Second World War, making him the perfect scientist administrator for 
the job (Trim, 2015). He remained chairperson until 1972 and was followed by a 
distinguished group of engineers, scientists and business people. 
Among the Glassco Commission recommendations was the establishment of a Science 
Ministry. However, the government held off on appointing a science minister. The 
Glassco Commission report also recommended an institutional framework to make 
government R&D more cohesive. Prime Minister Pearson, however, on receiving the 
report, consulted former NRC president C.J. Mackenzie who advised against more 
efforts to coordinate government R&D in existing government institutions (Hayes, 1973; 
Lamontagne report, 1970). Despite the ultimate dismissal of this recommendation, the 
Glassco Commission helped establish a policy environment more hospitable to 
promoting the coordination of R&D and scientific research management by the political 
field (Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 2001). 
In 1967, Omond Solandt called for a closer relationship between Canadian science and 
industry. He also advocated for the creation of mission- or goal-oriented research and 
development as a means to achieve national priorities through government support and 
industrial cooperation (Trim, 2015; Lévi-Lloyd, 1989). The effort to preserve the 
autonomy of the science field and the goal of the political field to harness science to 
achieve national priorities led to rising tensions during the economic and environmental 
crises that began in the 1970s (Holdsworth, 2002). With the oil crisis and the emerging 
environmental movement, resources no longer flowed as freely into Canadian science. 
At the end of the 1960s, OECD examiners also concluded, as had the Glassco 
Commission in 1962, that there was a lack of coordination of the nation’s science and 
technology infrastructures (OECD, 1969). Omond Solandt commented on this in the 
Science Forum noting that “Some Canadian scientists will no doubt be highly critical of 
the OECD report because of its continued emphasis on the need for relating 
expenditures on science and technology more closely to national social and economic 
needs. The Science Council has been similarly criticized” (Solandt, 1970. The OECD 
report: achieving a better balance). He then offered the reasoning that “Both the SCC 
[Science Council of Canada] and the OECD are trying, by their advice, to achieve a 
better balance in our scientific community" as a way to explain his stance to the agents 
from the science field who were in opposition to the policy.  
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The Science Council of Canada’s 1968 report Towards a National Science Policy for 
Canada also advocated greater collaboration between university, government and 
industrial scientists to build multidisciplinary teams (Science Council for Canada, 1968). 
In light of these changes, conflict began to bloom as political authority threatened 
scientific autonomy. The 1968 report marked the year that the Science Forum was 
founded to “become a national forum in which Canadian scientists and engineers can 
discuss their vital issues” (Science Forum, 1968). An editorial in the Science Forum also 
confirms this arguably deliberate timing in the start of the controversy over national 
science policy as it notes “…in 1968, the federal government’s new science policy 
machinery had just begun to roll…” (Science Forum, 1973. After six years: New needs, 
new responses).     
The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) was 
created in the mid 1970s with a role as a granting agency for research conducted at 
Canadian Universities, which is a role it took over from the NRC (Holdsworth, 2002). 
With the former role of the NRC as national science policy advisor taken over by the 
Science Council, the NRC was left to conduct research on its own without the power to 
grant research funding and advise government on science policy. This served ultimately 
to strip a strong institute in the science field of its political power and autonomy.  
The Science Council report Towards a National Science Policy for Canada in 1968 along 
with the OECD report preceded the Senate Committee Report or the “Lamontagne 
Report” entitled A Science Policy for Canada, which formalized a proposal for a 
framework of science policy. The Special Committee on Science Policy that produced 
the report was chaired by economist Maurice Lamontagne. The report was issued in 
three major volumes from 1968-1977. The Lamontagne Report set the stage for 
policymakers in the political field to coordinate government science efforts and conflicted 
with the entrenched norms of the science community and the autonomy of the science 
field. The report questioned the status of academic science as an intellectual endeavour 
that should somehow be considered apart from society and afforded special rights and 
privileges. The Lamontagne Report ultimately met with formidable resistance from what 
has been termed the “Republic of Science”4 as scientists resisted the attempt at central 
coordination by the political field. The report demythologised the “Republic of Science” 																																																								
4 “Republic of Science” is a metaphor that was first coined by Michael Polanyi. The term was used liberally 
in the Science Forum by agents from all three fields to describe the science field and its agents. It is a term 
that is still used today. 
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and repositioned science as a social activity like any other. The committee argued that 
scientific elitism had driven Canadian science policy from the time the NRC was 
established in 1916 (Lamontagne report, 1968-77). It was this report that called for 
scientific research to align with national priorities or mission-oriented goals. It is also this 
report that recommended the creation of NSERC to take over from the NRC as a funder 
of academic research (Holdsworth, 2002). Despite the press coverage of the 
controversial shift, the report “fell dead from the press,” as it failed to garner attention or 
support from then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and his cabinet (Dufour and de la 
Mothe, 1993).  
One recommendation that stuck from the Lamontagne report was the creation of the 
Ministry of State for Science and Technology (MOSST) in 1971 as it replaced the 
Science Secretariat. The MOSST was instated to provide science policy advice to the 
government and it eventually also planned and prioritized Canada’s science and 
technology efforts – thus, its authority also encroached on the NRC’s mandate 
(Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 2001). According to Atkinson-Grosjean et al., this move was 
highly politically motivated as the NRC was a Crown corporation and as such beyond 
direct interference by politicians. So, stripping away the NRC’s budget and 
responsibilities was a strategic move to transfer these responsibilities to an agency that 
could be more easily moved by political will. NSERC also fell under the authority of 
MOSST. Scientists expressed their concern within the pages of the Science Forum over 
the role of the MOSST and the move to usurp power from the scientific community to 
influence science policy and have a say in research funding. This can be witnessed in 
the comment by a University scientist (John Scott Cowan, Associate professor, 
physiology, University of Ottawa faculty of medicine and Chairman, Canadian Federation 
of Biological Societies) who noted that "…the realization was still to come that the senior 
civil servants at MOSST and the granting councils were government's spokesmen to the 
research community rather than the community's spokesmen to government” (Cowan, 
1977. Research lobbying: choosing the next step). He went on to voice his concern that 
scientists would no longer be implicated in political decisions, asking “Will the research 
community have real input on the choice of persons to sit on granting councils, the Inter-
Council Coordinating Committee, and the Canadian Committee on Financing University 
Research, or will incestuous consultation within the civil service be the order of the day?"  
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Likewise, science journalists echoed the concern of scientists in the Science Forum. In 
an article on the MOSST in the Science Forum, science journalist Jeff Carruthers noted 
that “A year ago, when the Science Forum tried to obtain the ministry’s views on its 
accomplishments up to that time, officials there balked. They argued, as they have 
almost from MOSST’s inception, that it is a policy ministry (not an operational one) 
whose responsibilities more often than not involve behind-the-scenes development and 
co-ordination and whose accomplishments more often than not were difficult to identify 
as tangible successes (that is, as separate policies)” (Carruthers, 1974. The first three 
years of the science ministry: what has been achieved?). Carruthers also alludes to the 
political powers going underground yet continuing to influence policy out of sight: 
“Therefore, MOSST should remain behind the scenes. … much [of what MOSST set out 
to accomplish] was in the form of secret advice to the Prime Minister’s Office or other 
government agencies.” 
The statement again implicates a privileged few that have the social capital to influence 
policy decisions – C.M. Drury, Minister of the State for Science and Technology in this 
case. The article goes on to indicate that an information release policy may already be in 
place: “Both Auréle Beaulnes, then secretary and deputy minister of MOSST (and 
destined a few days after I interviewed him to be shunted out of his job by former health 
deputy minister Maurice LeClair, who can be expected to return to the ‘shush’ period of 
information policy)” (Carruthers, 1974. The first three years of the science ministry: what 
has been achieved?). The article by Carruthers also indicates that the publication of 
scientific work funded by the public was being obstructed. He notes: “until recently, 
universities were complaining that professors didn’t have freedom to publish results of 
contract work for the government…. A lot of the work of the ministry never surfaces: 
there are countless studies performed with public money and of use to segments of the 
public that for a variety of reasons are never released publicly.” This marks a much 
earlier reference to the ‘muzzling’ of scientists and an information release policy that 
precedes the contemporary controversy under the Harper government. 
By 1973, the MOSST had acquired more power to shape science policies through a 
strengthened mandate in budgetary powers, science policy framework and the allocation 
of research funding.   
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The philosophical intent of the Haldane principle of scientific autonomy, internal 
allocation of resources and competition for individual excellence through vigorous peer 
review were key elements that were recognized in the science and political field alike. 
Despite the push of the political field to assert authority over the autonomy of the 
scientific field, it still remains a set of principles that continues to be central within the 
science field to this day.  
Historical construction of the controversy over environmental policy 
Historically, Canadian federal scientific activities focused on practical applications and 
the exploitation of the country’s national resources. The first ever federally supported 
science initiative was the Geological Survey of Canada that was founded in 1841, which 
laid the basis for the mining industry. Marine research stations for the fishing industry 
developed in the 1890s, followed by forestry experimental stations. Before the end of the 
19th century, several national laboratories were established by different government 
departments for the exploitation of natural resources (Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 2001).  
In early 1972, the SCC suggested that Canada should “provide the leadership necessary 
to work toward a more equitable distribution of the benefits of natural resources to all 
mankind” at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm 
(Science Council of Canada, 1973). This was combined with a call by the Council to 
embrace environmentalism. The media coverage of this radical statement by a Crown 
corporation headed by Canada’s leading scientists caught the attention of the Canadian 
media and public (Trim, 2015). In 1973, the SCC announced that Canadians should 
move from a consumer society obsessed with the exploitation of resources to a 
‘Conserver Society’ that engaged in more constructive endeavors. Driven by the oil crisis 
and the explosion of environmentalism in the 1970s, Canadians embraced the idea of 
the Conserver Society, according to Trim (2015). The Globe and Mail featured the 
leading advocates of this switch in national priorities (Marshall, 1976). At the same time, 
a leading environmental group in the 1970s, Pollution Probe, outlined how Canada could 
be restructured as a Conserver Society. This also coincided with efforts in the 1960s to 
early 1970s to base government policy on scientifically founded advice. In 1968, soon 
after its formation, the government of Pierre Trudeau went about reforming the Canadian 
state in the name of improving efficiency and democratizing decision-making (Aucoin, 
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1986).  “Rational management” was the order of the day and involved a centralized 
policy structure around the Cabinet and the use of expert knowledge.  
As such, “entire departments were remade around the desire to effectively employ 
science-based policy” (Trim, 2015). Thus, the Department of Energy, Mines and 
Resources (EMR) was revamped by the Trudeau government in the early 1970s and 
mandated to formulate an energy policy and direct resource development. The 
government also staffed the EMR with highly educated ministers with a background in 
the oil and gas industry to head the department and act as energy experts with the ability 
to formulate policy (Fossum, 1997), starting with Donald Macdonald – an “aggressive 
and nationalist minister” (Trim, 2015). As the EMR transitioned into a policymaking body, 
it made every effort to integrate scientific expertise as part of Trudeau’s “rational 
management” mandate. The EMR built close ties with the SCC – so much so that 
advisors on oil and gas and experts in energy analysis, including R.P Charbonnier, 
moved between the department and the Council. The SCC assisted the EMR in helping 
formulate policy and studying the nation’s energy options (Lévi-Lloyd, 1989). 
Charbonnier asked the Council in 1971 to spearhead a study to complement the EMR’s 
assessment of Canadian energy policy (Trim, 2015).       
The Science Council’s report Towards a National Science Policy called for a “total 
systems approach,” which emphasized optimization (Science Council for Canada, 1968). 
The concepts of systems-based optimization was an offshoot of operational research, 
general systems theory and pre-cyberspace enthusiasm for cybernetic control theory 
that came about in the post Second World War period (Holdsworth, 2002). The Report 
noted that innovation was very capital-intensive and should be weighed against 
economic gain and social benefit. The adoption of this approach in the 1970s is also 
captured within the pages of the Science Forum: “The small budgetary program review 
and assessment group within the ministry has recently developed a special 
computerized screening mechanism, designed to measure whether a particular program 
proposed by a government agency meets various government criteria for science” 
(Carruthers, 1974. The first three years of the science ministry: what has been 
achieved?).   
The SCC placed a lot of weight on quantitative analysis to shape its approach to the 
environment (as did the MOSST in its approach to policymaking). In 1972, the Council 
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put forth its concern for Canada’s environment with its report on pollution and resource 
depletion, It Is Not Too Late – Yet, to inform Canadians that the nation was facing 
serious environmental issues. By 1973, the SCC had produced 21 reports, covering 
issues including forest management and industrial innovation (Trim, 2015). The Council 
took the view that if Canadians and their government embraced scientists and their 
growing knowledge on environmental, social and economic problems, effective solutions 
could be developed. As a group made up of elite scientists, this view from the Council is 
hardly surprising. The SCC also embraced two key analytic tools when advising on 
policy for environmental protection and resource development: input-output analysis and 
systems analysis. The Council held the opinion that these two techniques would help 
policymakers gauge the consequences of policies before they are implemented. This 
viewpoint signals the growing dependence of the SCC on mathematical simulations to 
conceptualize environmental protection. Environmentalism also relied heavily on the 
quantitative approach to both understand human impacts on the world and communicate 
it to the masses.  
In this way, the SCC used quantification and the supposed ability to simulate the world 
and “predict” potential futures as leverage to gain political influence for the science field 
(Trim, 2015). This reliance on quantitative analysis was also in line with the Trudeau 
government’s mandate for rational management to inform national policy. With the 
emergence of the oil crisis and the environment as a political issue, the SCC’s ability to 
provide seemingly objective guidance on policy issues became a useful political tool. In 
this way, agents from the science field with scientific expertise benefited from regimes of 
quantification to force the state to rely on their knowledge to formulate and defend policy. 
And this in turn, strengthened the position of experts in the science field when engaging 
in debates on controversial policy issues (Porter, 1995).  
In the 1970s, expanding scientific knowledge about the Canadian arctic and subarctic 
led to a growing understanding among scientists of the fragility of northern ecosystems 
and the desire of local populations (including the Inuit) to have a say in northern 
development plans (Bocking, 2007). This created tension between scientists and 
advocates of northern development as the potentially harmful environmental impact of 
mineral extraction and oil pipelines came to light. The Trudeau government’s emphasis 
on science, the national conflict on development and the oil crisis all served to set the 
stage for the SCC’s Conserver Society (Trim, 2015).   
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In 1975, a socially active physicist and metallurgist, Ursula Franklin took over as head of 
the SCC and founded the Conserver Society committee (Trim, 2015). Under her 
leadership, the SCC’s committee fleshed out the Conserver Society. The committee 
rationalized that the Conserver Society arose “from a deep concern for the future, and 
the realization that decisions taken today, in such areas as energy and resources, may 
have irreversible and possibly destructive impacts in the medium to long term” (Science 
Council of Canada, 1977). Under Franklin, the SCC called for environmental 
responsibility and sought to inform Canadians on the environmental issues at hand. The 
Council took the view that an informed Canadian society would accept the SCC’s view of 
the country’s long-term interests and pressure the government to adopt a program of 
efficiency and conservation. Informing the public through alliances with agents in the 
journalism field and an industrial strategy to shift the country’s reliance on extractive 
resource industries to the use of renewable resources were the SCC’s main goals. 
These set the stage to insert the environment and its fragile nature into Canadian 
politics. This stance clashed with the government’s policies of encouraging growth 
through resource exploitation and it also ran against the idea of consumerism (Trim, 
2015).  
By the mid-1970s, several environmental groups (including Friends of the Earth and 
Back-to-the-landers) embraced the Conserver Society (Nash, 1979). As did the Pollution 
Probe group based in Toronto – Canada’s largest environmental group at the time that 
also championed renewable energy and the Conserver Society (O’Connor, 2014). The 
rising oil prices, growing environmental concern and the media’s attention on this 
movement put the Conserver Society and the morality of thrift in the minds of Canadians 
by the late 1970s (Fulford, 1977; Gwyn, 1977). We can observe an alliance here 
between the science and journalism fields to push the environmentalism agenda.   
By the mid 1970s, government departments concerned with the environment also 
adopted the Conserver Society view, including Environment Canada. Using the 
discussions around the Conserver Society to define its mission, Environment Canada 
outlined how it could help Canadians better comprehend their relationship with the 
environment (Trim, 2015). The SCC’s influence drew the ire of Canada’s most powerful 
think tank, the Fraser Institute as it flew in the face of their commitment to free trade and 
rapid growth (Palda, 1979; Trim, 2015). Critics asserted that the Council failed to 
understand the impact of foreign ownership and the SCC had become little more than a 
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means for scientists and engineers to lobby government for more funding and 
employment.   
In the 1980s, the goals of the Conserver Society merged with the Brundtland 
Commission’s formulation of “sustainable development” (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987). This gradually became a ubiquitous part of 
politics, contributing to the emergence of the environment as a political issue. The 
Conserver Society had a significant impact on environmentalism and Canadian politics 
as it expanded environmental concern to include economic development and the notions 
of sustainability that have dominated contemporary environmental politics, including 
those that came into play in the contemporary controversy over the ‘muzzling’ of 
scientists.  
In the historical construction of this controversy, we see government advisors with 
financial support from the state analyze the nation’s future and suggest ways to mitigate 
environmental destruction. This group of historical agents from the elite in the science 
field represented well-financed and largely independent centres of policy analysis that 
contributed greatly to the public debate on the environment (Trim, 2015). Of all the 
centres of policy analysis, the SCC was particularly influential in sparking the country’s 
desire to use science as an engine of economic growth and to adopt political 
rationalization. At its heart was a belief that through the proper application, science could 
improve the lives of Canadians. This sentiment is prevalent in the commentary from 
agents in the science and science journalism fields in the Science Forum. Even though 
Canadian environmental politics reflected global environmentalism, the issues remained 
national. Agents from the science, science journalism and political fields shaped this 
controversy as an issue that reflected deeply held political, economic and ideological 
views dominant in each field.     
Historical construction of the ‘muzzling’ of scientists 
For much of the second half of the 20th century, the classic linear model of the research 
process was adhered to where public science performed basic research and then private 
science developed and commercialized this research (Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 2001). 
Public science happened in government and universities and was freely disseminated 
through journal publications. Private science, in contrast, was performed by industry and 
its commercial techniques were secret and ‘protected’ as intellectual property. Another 
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distinction between public (basic) and private (applied) science is that when there was 
insufficient economic incentives but a public need, public science stepped forward to act 
for the ‘public good’ while private science stepped aside. Invoking a clean separation 
between public and private; basic and applied; and open and secret was a politically 
expedient move geared to maintain wartime levels of government funding for research.  
Despite this artificial demarcation of public versus private, the linear model of science 
research and development dominated science policy until the 1970s. Before then, the 
funding of public (basic) research was justified in terms of its long-term payoff in the 
private (applied) sector, which would generate future public returns in terms of 
employment, innovations and tax revenues.  
In the 1970s with the recession, oil crisis and economic instability in industry, many of 
the post-war welfare state settlements were questioned. As more publicly funded 
discoveries were privatized in the form of biotechnology patents, the demarcations 
between public and private began to erode. At the end of the 1970s, market criteria and 
corporate structures were imported from the private sector and applied to public 
agencies and government departments (Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 2001). As previously 
mentioned, the Trudeau government of the 1970s adopted the idea of “rationalization” 
which called for government decisions to be founded on scientifically-based knowledge. 
The move by the government was supposedly done to improve efficiency and 
democratize decision-making (Aucoin, 1986). However, suspicions were raised that 
“rationalized management” would ultimately serve to garner support for private science 
at the expense of public science. Science journalist Peter Calamai (Southam News 
Services) aired his concerns that reflect this sentiment in the pages of the Science 
Forum: "Trudeau's technocrats call the process 'rationalization.' It means that the federal 
government will emphasize 'little science' [applied science] at the expense of 'big 
science' [basic science]" (Calamai, 1971. Trudeau's technocrats telegraph their 
punches). 
From the early 1980s on, accountability and relevance translated into closer links 
between public research and the market. Technology transfer and the commodification 
of knowledge are defined as the essential foundations for economic restructuring and 
international competitiveness. The gap between public science and private began to 
narrow even further. All government institutions were pushed into adopting an 
	 66	
“enterprise culture” by successive federal governments (Burchell, 1996). The science 
policies that were put into effect in the 1980s represent an increasing effort to tip the 
balance between economic capital and scientific capital in government research 
institutions (Bourdieu, 1969; 1988; Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 2001).  
In 1986, the Progressive Conservative government introduced a matching funds policy 
that required the granting councils to build partnerships with the private sector to 
increase public-private science collaborations in order to strengthen Canada’s 
international competitiveness (Atkinson-Grosjean et al., 2001). In 1988, under Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney, the Networks of Centres of Excellence (NCEs) was founded. 
The NCEs would be based in universities and would reach out to the private sector for 
assistance. The principle of drawing closer ties between the public and private sectors of 
science was the same as for the Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) that 
was established in 1962. While the NCEs used university financial systems, they were 
not accountable to the universities but rather to the NCE directorate in Ottawa, allowing 
the government to circumvent university power and autonomy and provincial jurisdiction. 
This strategy essentially boils down to a salient example of the domination of the political 
field over the science field – it represents the imposition of political authority over 
scientific autonomy.  
Stephen Harper took over the prime minister’s office in 2006 and many of the trends 
from previous decades of the adoption of a corporate culture in government and funding 
increases for private science as opposed to public science continued. Unfortunate side 
effects from this adoption of a corporate model for government has been restrictions on 
media access to publicly funded science, budget cuts for public science, publication 
restrictions and a focus on science that benefits industry (Douglas, 2015). After the 
Harper government came into office in 2006, much of its activity served to limit the use 
of scientific knowledge to constrain or regulate industrial and commercial development, 
particularly in the resource and energy sectors (Amend and Barney, 2016). A concerted 
effort was also made by the Conservative government to orient Canada’s public science 
towards supporting commercial and industrial development. Combined, these efforts 
resulted from funding and personnel cuts to basic research, information control through 
new policies imposed on government scientists and structural adjustments to existing 
scientific funding and research institutes and organizations. Federal agencies that 
experienced major budget and personnel cuts included Environment Canada, Fisheries 
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and Oceans Canada, Statistics Canada, Library and Archives Canada, NSERC and the 
NRC (Amend and Barney, 2016).     
The controversy over the ‘muzzling’ of scientists began in 2006 when a climatologist 
working for Environment Canada was stopped from attending a press club luncheon for 
the launch of a fictional book he wrote. Although the press releases did not link the 
climatologist to Environment Canada, he was ordered not to attend. A spokesperson for 
Canada’s environment minister offered the explanation that proper procedure was not 
followed, alluding to an existing information release policy (Austen, 2006). By November 
2007, Environment Canada had new official media policies in place (Magnuson-Ford 
and Gibbs, 2014). Scientists were now required to seek approval from media relations or 
communications offices within the agency prior to answering media requests for 
interviews or information. Agents in the science journalism field by and large claimed 
that these requests were not approved in a timely manner and scientists claimed that 
they were instructed to repeat specific talking points (Gatehouse, 2013; O’Hara, 2010; 
Greenwood and Sandborn, 2013). The new media protocol came under fire for limiting 
the freedom of federal scientists to communicate publicly and professionally (Holmes, 
2013; Klinkenborg, 2013; Linnitt, 2013; Mancini, 2013). Other federal departments, such 
as Fisheries and Oceans Canada were said to have similar media policies (Linnitt, 
2013).  
In 2009, the budget cuts affected three granting councils that provided research funding 
at Canadian universities: the Canadian Institute of Health Research (CIHR), the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and NSERC (Canadian 
Association of University Teachers, 2013). Critics of the Harper government’s “anti-
science” approach also pointed out that Mark Mullins, a climate change critic and former 
executive director of the Fraser Institute was appointed to the NSERC governing board 
in 2009 while John Weissenberger, a global warming skeptic was appointed to the board 
of the Canada Foundation for Innovation – an agency that provides funding for Canadian 
science research and technology development (Curry, 2009).   
The Harper government announced the closure of the national Library and Archives 
Canada sites in 2012 as it moved towards digitization. The scientific community, 
however, raised concerns that the dismantling of these libraries was haphazard and 
resulted in the loss of fishery, ocean and environmental libraries. The accusation came 
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from scientists that much library material was destroyed without being digitized. The 
political move has been tied to the Harper government’s perception that environmental 
science threatens the exploitation of natural resources (Nikiforuk, 2013; Amend and 
Barney, 2016). Soon after its election into power in 2006, the Conservative government 
made it clear that they opposed Canada’s Kyoto Protocol pledges, which aimed at a 6% 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2012. In December 2011, the Harper 
government announced that Canada would be the first nation to officially withdraw from 
its Kyoto pledges (Holmes, 2013; Toronto Star, 2011).      
In 2012, Canadian scientists looking to provide a briefing to the media on the state of 
sea ice in the Arctic failed to achieve the “nine levels of approval” required by their 
department (Munro, 2014). Agents from the science and science journalism fields alike 
began to make a concerted effort to raise public awareness on the issue. In 2013, the 
union representing public service employees in Canada, the Professional Institute of the 
Public Service of Canada surveyed thousands of Canadian government scientists and 
found that 90% “do not feel that they can speak freely to the media about the work they 
do” (PIPSC, 2013). Despite the government’s claim that many scientists provide 
interviews (CBC News, 2013), a decline in interviews on topics such as climate change 
were notable (De Souza, 2010). In addition to the information policy, other new policies 
served to reduce environmental scrutiny that could hamper projects aimed to boost 
economic growth. For instance, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA), 
which came into effect in July 2012, mandated that any project that did not fit the federal 
government’s definition of “major” would undergo assessment according to provincial 
criteria and where provincial criteria did not exist, projects would not undergo any 
environmental assessment (Davidson, 2012). The CEAA sparked a drastic drop in the 
number of departments and agencies that could perform environmental assessments – 
from 40 to 3. The government explained the cuts as an attempt to accelerate the 
processing of reviews on projects that would benefit the Canadian economy (Davidson, 
2012).       
The information flow was further stymied in 2013. Despite Conservative MP Kellie 
Leitch’s assurance that government scientists were always free to publish their results 
(CBC News, 2013), the story broke that Fisheries and Oceans Canada was requiring 
pre-approval by ministry officials before submitting their work for peer review and 
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publication (Birchard and Lewington, 2013). The government explained that this new 
policy was a tool to protect its intellectual property rights.  
In tandem with new communication policies for government scientists and access 
restrictions for the media, the federal government began closing down scientific 
institutions and facilities, such as scientific libraries where records going back decades 
were discarded (Wells, 2013). Other organizations and offices that ended up on the 
chopping block include the Office of the National Science Advisor, the National Round 
Table on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE) and the Canadian Foundation for 
Climate and Atmospheric Sciences. The Office of the National Science Advisor, which 
was created in 2004 to channel science advice to the prime minister, was reassigned to 
the industry minister in 2006 then closed in 2008 (Hoag, 2008). The NRTEE that worked 
to develop policies to encourage sustainable development in Canada and reported on 
Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions to meet specified goals was closed in 2013. The 
Canadian Foundation for Climate Atmospheric Sciences was the primary source for 
climate research in Canada. Its’ closing eliminated funding for many environmental 
monitoring and research programs and facilities (Voices-Voix, 2014). Other closures 
include the Ocean Contaminants and Marine Toxicology Program (Harnett, 2012), the 
Canadian Policy Research Networks (CPRN, 2009; Voices-Voix, 2011), and the Mersey 
Biodiversity Centre (Moase, 2014). 
Several facilities that were targeted for closure but saved in reduced form include the 
Polar Environment Atmospheric Research Laboratory, which takes Arctic measurements 
of the atmosphere, ozone layer and impacts of climate change (Mancini, 2013b); the 
Experimental Lakes Area, an ecological research station that conducts large-scale 
studies of freshwater lakes and assesses the impact of contaminants (Raj, 2013); and 
the Kluane Lake Research Station, which conducts research on the largest non-polar 
icefield in the world (Zada, 2012). The trend appears to be closures of research centres 
that dealt with levels of pollution and the impacts of climate change. The trend also 
highlights the controversy over the development of the Arctic that was prevalent between 
agents in the science and political fields in the 1970s, which was a hot button 
environmental policy issue at the time.      
Along with the alleged communication sanctions and cuts to research facilities was the 
redirection of funds. Prior to the Harper government, the NRC supported basic research 
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in government labs and the commercialization of that research. Since the Harper 
government came into power, the NRC claims to have been relegated to acting as a 
“concierge service” for industry (NRC, 2013; 2014). In May 2013, the Harper government 
revealed its rebranding plan for the NRC that would focus the agency away from basic 
research in the pursuit of knowledge gathering and discovery and towards applied 
research instead that would support Canadian industry (Amend and Barney, 2016). 
Instead of supporting basic research, its purpose now is to provide support to scientists 
working in the private sector. The restructured NRC would be a “business-driven, 
industry-relevant research and technology organization” (NRC, 2013). Another funder of 
basic research in universities, NSERC has experienced budget cuts as well as the 
majority of funds redirected towards “target areas…that are in the national interest from 
a social and economic perspective” (Mancini, 2013c). Many NSERC grants now require 
matching funds from the private sector. Thus, research in government and university 
labs now require industry interest to gain funding. These changes were made according 
to NSERC to “streamline operations and ensure maximum efficiencies” (Mancini, 2013c) 
– a reasoning that echoes the sentiment behind the 1970s Trudeau government’s 
“rationalized management” approach.  
According to material released to justify the information release policy, prior to these 
restrictions, media coverage of scientist without these sanctions led to interviews that 
resulted in “surprises to Ministers and Senior Management” and “limited coordination of 
messages across the country” (Greenwood and Sandborn, 2013).  
In 2013, Democracy Watch filed a complaint with the federal information commissioner 
concerning the government’s interference with the freedom of federal scientists to speak 
publicly about their research and findings (Democracy Watch, 2013a). The 
accompanying report (Democracy Watch, 2013b) condemned the government’s actions 
as “a threat to democracy,” a charge that would later be echoed by prominent Canadian 
scientist and environmental activist David Suzuki (2013).   
At the end of 2014, the editorial board of the Toronto Star, Canada’s largest daily 
newspaper, commented on Canadian science policy, noting that science policy had 
taken a “catastrophic course” under the Harper government. They reflected that the turn 
away from basic science to application-driven research and the commercial public-
private partnerships that had been built under the Conservative government had 
	 71	
“essentially transformed much of Canada’s research budget into a business subsidy” 
(Toronto Star, 2014). At this time, a number of editorials and opinion pieces in 
mainstream media and scientific publications both in Canada and internationally since 
2006 had served to label the Harper government as “anti-science” (e.g., Globe and Mail, 
2013; Toronto Star, 2013; Klinkenborg, 2013; Bell, 2012; Nature 2012a; 2012b; Douglas, 
2013; Holmes, 2013). A report by the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (2015) 
described the Harper government as having an “insatiable appetite for controlling the 
flow of information and the substance of political debate” (Amber, 2015).  
The current Trudeau Liberals presented their victory in the 2015 federal election as a 
restoration – “Canada is back!” Among the pledges made by the current government is 
one to restore science to its “rightful place” in the Government of Canada (Duncan, 
2015). Since then, the Liberal government has instated a decision to withdraw restrictive 
media and communication policies for federal scientists, to reinstate the long-form 
census, and create a chief science officer position. 	 	
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
The interactions between the three fields during the controversies in question were 
explored in this thesis to identify patterns of opposition and alliance between these 
fields. This was done using ‘Bourdieu’s conceptual triad’ of practice, habitus and social 
fields.  
Bourdieu’s conceptual triad (practice, habitus and field) and the pursuit of capital 
Bourdieu’s conceptual triad can be used to provide a deeper analysis of how these fields 
relate to each other in times of controversy that centers around science policy. The triad 
of practice, habitus and field helps us gain a better understanding of why certain 
alliances and oppositions came about using the logic inherent in each specific field 
examined.  
Bourdieu portrays ‘practice’ as a concept that encompasses activities that possess a 
social character and bears meaning. In the case of this thesis, the practice under 
examination is the participation in media discourse on science policy controversies. 
According to Bourdieu, ‘practice’ can be theorized through the concept of ‘habitus, which 
is a concept that dictates that agents have a socially developed capacity to act a certain 
way depending on a system of predispositions that guide them to do so. 
To provide context and explain the stimulus behind the practice of agents who decide to 
act one way versus another, Bourdieu introduced the concept of ‘field.’ It is a space 
where a power struggle is waged and agents are located. Each social field provides a 
means of accumulating ‘capital’ and converting ‘capital’ between fields (Bourdieu, 1985). 
Four types of ‘capital’ are considered here: economic, social, cultural and symbolic (see 
Chapter 3 for definitions). All four forms of ‘capital’ can be used to acquire or “buy” better 
positioning.  
Journalism is considered part of the broader field of cultural production. Bourdieu 
understands the field of cultural production as high in cultural and symbolic capital but 
low in economic capital. This is in direct contrast to the field of power, which is high in 
economic capital and low in cultural capital. Agents in the journalism field vie for cultural, 
symbolic, economic and social capital. Cultural capital for journalists come in the form of 
their know-how and skills, the articles and news pieces that they produce as well as their 
educational credentials. Symbolic capital is the resources made available as a result of 
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prestige or recognition (Calhoun, 2002). The journalism field reproduces or publicizes 
knowledge produced elsewhere. It is considered heteronomous as it seeks to appeal to 
those outside the field (i.e. audiences or readers) rather than to its peers. This is how 
journalism generates economic capital, which is why it imposes its heteronomous values 
on other fields (Siapera and Syridou, 2012). The specific idiosyncrasy of the journalistic 
field is that the market weighs more heavily on it than on many other fields, according to 
Bourdieu (1998). Social capital in this field represents their networks of peers, sources 
and readers, which captures both the production and reception sides of journalism 
(Siapera and Spyridou, 2012). Journalists reporting on science and on science policy 
must acquire and maintain access to a network of agents in the political and science 
fields to function and gain a better standing within their field.  
In the scientific field, power is equivalent to scientific authority or the accumulation of 
scientific capital (peer-reviewed publications, grants) (Albert, 2011). This can be seen as 
the capacity to define what is legitimate or ‘good’ science. Thus, agents in the science 
field compete to gain access to the resources available in the science field (laboratory 
space, professorships, research funding, etc.) and control their distribution according to 
what is deemed ‘good’ science. Characterized by its own logic and shared assumptions, 
the scientific field should be viewed as a social arena that is relatively independent from 
the broader social environment, according to Bourdieu (Albert, 2011). The Haldane 
principle that sparked the ideal in scientific practice that the best scientific results are 
achieved when scientists are left to allocate their resources internally (see Chapter 5) 
ultimately serves to preserve the autonomy of the science field. The autonomy of this 
field is the result of a socio-historical process (see Chapter 5) and insulates the science 
field from domination by other fields. It also helps the science field maintain its internal 
rules where scientific capital is a highly valued commodity. According to Bourdieu, the 
volume of capital one possesses depends on the symbolic value attributed to the 
properties or resources one holds. Agents who possess more of a valued form of capital 
bring more weight to bear on defining what counts as legitimate power. The stock of 
capital that an agent possesses can rise or fall in value if the rules or logic of the field 
change. 
Agents in the political field require economic, social and cultural capital to gain entry to 
this field. For agents in the political field, gaining a favourable media presence in the 
public eye and greater social capital with journalists is a key element in building symbolic 
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capital. Symbolic capital (honour, prestige, power) is a reflection of other capital forms in 
aggregate. Thus, attaining certain recognized positions in a profession (scientific, 
political or journalistic) automatically bestows symbolic capital onto agents. Although 
symbolic capital can be attained on various levels and among various audiences, it is 
increasingly facilitated by forms of mass communication through the media (Davis, 
2010). Agents from both the science and political fields recognize that the media plays a 
key role in the accumulation of symbolic capital.  
The production of policy is a heavily mediated process as ‘public attention is steered by 
the attention of the media’ (Sontag, 2003). Journalists are not only operant in the 
journalistic field in the media but increasingly in the offices of politicians and 
policymakers, which can affect the very process of policy production (Lingard and 
Rawolle, 2004). The effectiveness of many policies, including science policy, is 
dependent on the portrayal of these policies in the media. The science journalism field 
also depends on the science and political fields as a source of reportage on science and 
science policies. Similarly, the science field has a dependence on the government and 
the science journalism field for positive media coverage and hence favourable funding 
and policy directions. 
Bourdieu’s field theory suggests that fields evolve through the on-going clash between 
those who want to conserve a single dominant logic and those who advance a single 
alternative logic. In the controversies examined here, the policies imposed on the 
science field by the political field would change the rules that dominated for so long in 
the science field. The greater the control scientists can exert over the conditions under 
which agents can enter and participate in the field, the greater the autonomy the field 
can maintain from external powers. The science policies examined in this thesis 
ultimately provide the political field with a means to dominate the science field. By 
requiring the science field to collaborate more closely with industry to obtain funding and 
by making economic gain its ultimate mission, these policies erode scientific capital and 
elevate economic capital instead. An increased role for socio-economic stakeholders, 
such as agents from the political and economic fields, through participation in the 
establishment of research priorities and the evaluation of research proposals also 
implies a shift in the field’s inclusion criteria and facilitates the entry of players whose 
primary goal is not the acquisition of scientific authority but instead the use of scientific 
knowledge for economic or political gains. Essentially, a capitalistic market logic was 
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imposed onto the scientific field. This changes the rules of the game in the science field 
that is part of the habitus of its agents and naturally sparked resistance from scientists.  
Agents in the science field possess close ties with agents in the science journalism field 
and vice versa as the agents from these fields share a mutual dependence. This form of 
social capital or network of people that the science field had access to was tapped as a 
resource that could be mobilized to oppose political authority over scientific autonomy 
and conserve the existing rules and autonomy of the science field. This could have been 
the reason behind the creation of the Science Forum, which was a collaborative effort 
between prominent science journalist David Spurgeon who was the editor of the journal 
and various university scientists who sat on the editorial board. Agents from the science 
journalism field were perhaps compelled to align with agents in the science field in 
opposition to these policies as a means to preserve this social capital of networks 
formed with the agents of the science field on whom they relied on as a source of their 
reportage. In the contemporary controversy over an information release policy that 
allegedly prevented science journalists from accessing scientists and vice versa, the 
alignment of agents in the science journalism field with those from the science field could 
likely be attributed to the perception of a direct block imposed on their access to their 
sources. In the historical example contained in the Science Forum, agents from the 
science journalism field referred to secrecy surrounding science policy decisions as well 
as alleged that an information release policy was in effect even in the 1970s that 
prevented science journalists from accessing scientists. This could have given science 
journalists all the more reason to oppose the policies and the political field in the 
historical controversies examined here.  
Science journalism, science and policymaking interactions 
The practice of engaging in science controversies (national science policy and 
environmental policy in the Science Forum and the “muzzling” of scientists on the CSWA 
website) show an alignment between agents from the science and science journalism 
fields when the autonomy of the science field is threatened by political authority (see 
Table 4 in Chapter 4: Results). Agents from both the science and science journalism 
fields showed opposition to political authority over science. The strongest alignment 
between the fields of science and science journalism appears in the contemporary 
controversy. Among the controversies examined, the contemporary controversy on the 
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‘muzzling’ of scientists also appears to be the most polarizing as there were no neutral 
opinion statements captured in the instance of this practice. This may be due to the fact 
that the ‘muzzling’ of scientists represents an obstacle to both fields by the political field 
(see Chapter 5) as the science information release policy of the Harper government 
directly obstructed science journalists from functioning as agents in their field to inform 
the public on events that bear an impact on said public. An “anti-science” trope appears 
to be leveled against the political field by agents in the science and science journalism 
fields in both the historical and contemporary example of science policy controversies.  
Aside from the “opposition to government policy,” the theme that was strongest among 
all three controversies was the observation of “government misinformation or lack of 
information to the public” by agents of the science and science journalism fields (see 
Table 5 in Chapter 4). There is evidence of information release restrictions on 
government scientists from the historical example found in the Science Forum. This is 
particularly interesting as the ‘muzzling’ of scientists is an action that has thus far only 
been applied to the Harper government in the contemporary controversy. Yet, opinion 
statements captured in the Science Forum during the 1970s when the Trudeau (senior) 
government was in power alludes to an earlier attempt by the government to control the 
release of government scientific information to the press. This appears to have a 
historical genesis rooted in the move by the political field to shift funding and resources 
from public (basic) science to private (industrial) science (Chapter 5). The shift from a 
public or open approach to scientific research to private or corporate secrecy appears to 
have had a hand in shaping the contemporary controversy of the ‘muzzling’ of scientists. 
Other themes that did appear in the historical as well as contemporary controversies 
was the “political involvement of scientists” and the call for “more funding for science” 
(Table 5). The call for scientists to enter the political arena that emerge from this data 
analysis was mostly driven by scientists. Agents from the science journalism field appear 
to be mostly silent on the subject, with a minority supporting and a few standing in 
opposition of the view that scientists should be involved in politics. The call for more 
government funding for science or opposition to reduced government funding for science 
appears to be shared by scientists and science journalists as witnessed in the opinions 
examined in the historical example – with a majority of scientists championing this 
cause. This was not a strong theme in the contemporary example and is one that was 
only found among agents in the science field in the contemporary controversy.  
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The alignment of opinions between science journalists and scientists appear strong 
when collaborating to oppose the imposition of political authority over scientific 
autonomy. There are some clues captured that help explain why this alliance is valued 
by the science field. A commentary from David Spurgeon (editor of the Science Forum 
and science writer for the Globe and Mail) alludes to the benefits to the science field of 
having the press on their side: “Dr. Connell [University of Toronto’s vice-president for 
research and planning] said [at the CSWA’s fifth Annual Science Writing Seminar] that 
the science writers had played an important part in influencing the federal government to 
increase funds in this year’s estimates for the Medical Research Council, and the 
Canada Council” (Spurgeon, 1975. Somebody out here is listening). There are also 
statements from agents in the science field that show that scientists are aware of the 
benefits of the alliance with the science journalism field. J.G. Parr, dean of applied 
science at the University of Windsor (and editorial board member of the Science Forum) 
noted that at the Progressive Conservatives Policy Conference in Niagara Falls, science 
policy was included on the program and that the purpose of this was  “to bring the 
subject to the attention of party members and politicians” (Parr, 1969. Getting together 
with Progressive Conservative thinkers). He goes on to note the failure of the party to do 
so but recognizes that “If this was achieved at all it was through the press rather than the 
ranks of the party." Taken together, the statements allude to benefits in social capital to 
the science field when alliances are formed with the science journalism field, which one 
may theorize is connected to the press’s ability to sway public opinion and potentially 
mobilize the public to pressure the political field to bend in their favour. Alliance with the 
science journalism field, which has access to the public and thus ability to sway the 
political field, also can and has (as seen by the statements presented) resulted in 
economic capital for the science field (e.g. by influencing an increase in government 
funding to science). 
In a statement by J.A. Morrison, director of the Institute for Materials Research at 
McMaster University (and Science Forum founder and editorial board member), he 
suggests that agents from the science field should cultivate this alliance when he notes 
that scientists should “expend less of our effort on adversary politics and more on trying 
to develop mutual confidence and respect between scientists and those who support 
them” (Morrison, 1975. We can't restrict scientists and get unexpected finds). His 
statement also gives us a glimpse of how this alliance is valued on a more personal level 
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when he comments on the friendship between himself and the editor of the Science 
Forum: “In our small corner and through our friendly arguments, the editor and I are 
trying to help with that [developing mutual confidence and respect]." 
There is also recognition from science journalists in the Science Forum of a bias by 
agents from the science journalism field towards science, as can be seen in this 
comment from the editor: “…we must admit a bias in favour of science rather than 
against it” (Spurgeon, 1978. A new magazine for a new era). Spurgeon also explains 
why he values the alliance with the science field when he notes that “Despite its 
limitations, we see the scientific approach as among the most valuable man has ever 
adopted for achieving insights into the nature of the universe.” This echoes the minor 
theme “belief in the ability of science to find solutions” found in the opinion statements on 
government environmental policy debates (see Chapter 4, Theme 10).   
There are also limits to the support that science journalists afford scientists in their 
aspirations. For instance, in the opinion statements calling for scientist involvement 
directly in the political field, science journalist Lydia Dotto, science writer for the Globe 
and Mail expressed her doubts in the ability of scientists to cope in the political sphere, 
noting that "…outside of their scientific disciplines, scientists appear to have no greater 
expertise than anyone else in manouevering through the quasi-parliamentary wrangles 
that inevitable befog such gatherings [SCITEC forum on science priorities in Canada]. 
Perhaps they have less, as the SCITEC meeting demonstrated" (Dotto, 1973. SCITEC: 
still groping in search of a role?). 
Science and technology development are central elements of the Canadian economy 
and as such, play a defining role in Canada as a modern society, and are crucial 
instruments in the organization of power and prosperity in Canada. Past studies on the 
conflict between the science and political fields notes that the charge of “anti-science” 
recently leveled against the Harper government gained wide-spread dissemination in the 
1990s when various strains of critical thought associated with postmodernism, the 
sociology of scientific knowledge, and social studies of science and technology were 
accused of hostility toward the scientific method and scientific knowledge, serving to 
undermine the validity of the scientific approach (Amend and Barney, 2016; Ashman and 
Baringer, 2001; Ross 1996; Segerstrale 2000; Sokal and Bricmont, 1998). However, as 
we see in the debate over science policy in the Science Forum, this accusation was 
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already present in the early 1970s when agents from the science field used the “anti-
science” trope to oppose political authority in the controversy over the building of a 
national science policy in Canada. 
A study by Kahan (2014) notes that the use of the “anti-science” trope to discredit 
another’s beliefs serves to produce a polarization of views that may not otherwise exist. 
This trope appears to be a common thread among the past and present controversies on 
science policy. Agents from the science and science journalism fields have used the 
“anti-science” trope effectively as a means to mobilize opposition in both sets of 
controversies. Chris Turner, in his book the War on Science, observed that for the 
Harper government, “…the purpose of research – of science generally – is to create 
opportunities for industry, and the purpose of government is to assist in that process in 
whatever way it can” (Turner, 2013). I would argue the same perception appears during 
the 1970s when the Trudeau (senior’s) government was in power.   
Then, as now, scientific knowledge is presented by agents in the science and science 
journalism fields as somehow above and beyond politics. As well, its practitioners are 
lauded as a rational group of players who are free of political implication (Amend and 
Barney, 2016; Turner, 2013). This view of scientists today is one that has persisted from 
the 1970s as witnessed by the statements captured in the Science Forum.     
The views of scientists and science journalists in the 1970s as seen through the opinion 
statements captured from the Science Forum show that the steps taken by the Harper 
government and the ‘muzzling’ of scientists is less than revolutionary and more the 
completion of a long-term political goal to refocus scientific research away from basic or 
public science towards more short-term practical applications for economic gain as we 
can see from the debates on the national science policies and environmental policies in 
the Science Forum (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et al., 2001). Concern over 
government restrictions on the flow of information and on scientists from speaking to 
science journalists was also an issue that was addressed in the Science Forum in the 
1970s. There is even evidence of government information release policies that may have 
served to ‘muzzle’ scientists in the 1970s in the Science Forum. Science journalist Jeff 
Carruthers commenting on an alleged silencing of scientists in the health protection 
branch notes that “The situation has deteriorated so much that scientists throughout the 
HPB [health protection branch] refuse to talk to the press, out of fear that they might 
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reveal something the minister’s office might decide is ‘policy’” (Carruthers, 1973. Political 
interference in the health protection branch).  
The overall theme of bringing science and technology into conformity with the priorities 
of market ideology and capitalist industry did not start with Harper but began in the 
1970s as evidenced by the controversies discussed in the Science Forum. Then as now, 
the government’s predisposition was encouraged by a series of high-level assessments 
of science and technology sectors in this country. The Lamontagne report (1968-1977) 
for instance echoes the sentiments of the 2011 report of the Expert Panel on Federal 
Support to Research and Development (known as the Jenkins Report). The 2011 report 
mandated by the minister of state for science and technology set the agenda to continue 
rather than reconceive the federal role in science and technology in terms of business 
innovation and commercialization. It continued a tradition to transform agencies such as 
the NRC into an agency for the support of business R&D rather than basic science 
(Expert panel on Federal Support to Research and Development, 2011). Likewise, 
restructuring of research granting bodies that tie scientific research ever more closely to 
the priorities of industry and commerce began in the 1970s. 
In the contemporary controversy, labeling the Harper government as “anti-science” is 
misleading. Ultimately, using an “anti-science” label may come at the expense of a more 
precise positioning of the Harper governments continuation to more closely align science 
with industrial development and commerce that arguable started in the 1970s.  
 
Limitations and Future Work 
Before concluding, it is worth briefly discussing some of the limits of this thesis. First, 
there were not many political opinion statements captured in both the historical and 
contemporary examples. This is likely due to a disinclination of policymakers to comment 
on controversial policy issues as well as the culture of secrecy surrounding the creation 
of science policy alluded to in both the historical as well as the contemporary examples. 
This, however, means that the results provide a limited exploration of the political field as 
related to the science and science journalism fields. Future research that explores 
additional political opinions is thereby warranted. Second, the strict methodological focus 
on science, science journalism and political fields meant that other (perhaps important) 
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fields were not included in the analysis. For example, upon assessment of the results, it 
appears that future work could include agents from the industrial field, adding opinion 
statements from private sector scientists and industrialists who had much to gain from 
the political move to shift funding and support away from public science to help the 
growth of private or applied science instead. Third, distinctions between agents from 
each field was more clear cut in the past controversies, making it easier to assign a 
particular agent to a specific field. Today, with scientists who also blog or report on 
science, there could be blurring of these lines in some instances. This is also true in the 
instances where former scientists joined government, making it difficult to tell in certain 
cases which field they may be representing when they comment on a controversy. 
Fourth, the presented analysis is likely uniquely tied to the examples explored and 
generalization from the results should be made with caution. Whether other topics 
support the conclusions presented here will also need to await further study. Lastly, the 
CSWA webpage used in this thesis only presents one particular archive of the ‘muzzling’ 
of scientists’ example, and one that was removed in 2015. This means that certain links 
may no longer be publically available. Future work to reconstruct a wider sample of this 
contemporary controversy may bear additional insights into how the science, science 
journalism and political fields interact.  
Conclusion 
The examination of the two historical controversies in the Science Forum on national 
science policy and environmental policy as well as the contemporary controversy on the 
‘muzzling’ of scientists found that: 
1. Science journalists appear to be in alignment with scientists to oppose political 
power when an attempt is made to impose political authority over scientific 
autonomy by agents in the political field through the use of controversial science 
policies.  
2. The contemporary controversy over the ‘muzzling’ of scientists can be better 
situated historically using the controversies on national science policy and 
environmental policy examined in the Science Forum as there are earlier 
instances of an observation of an information release policy and accusations of 
the ‘muzzling’ of government scientists in the 1970s in the Science Forum. 
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3. Science journalists are not in alliance with scientists on certain endeavours to 
resist political power as can be seen in the call for more funding for science and 
the push for more political involvement of scientists, which are agendas that may 
be spearheaded by scientists but are not broadly supported by science 
journalists.   
The historical controversies examined in this thesis provide a historical genesis and 
context to the contemporary controversy investigated. One of the great contributions of 
Bourdieu’s conceptual triad is its ability to understand society and its constituent parts in 
relational terms. Thus, rather than seeking to understand the field of science journalism 
in isolation, the triad allows us to conceptualize it and the actions of its players in relation 
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